简介
Recent scandals involving large firms, in the US and elsewhere, have intensified discussion regarding the role and conduct of the corporation. The contributors to this book argue that much of this debate has taken too narrow a view of the issue of corporate governance, and question some of the key assumptions of economic models. Drawing on insights from a variety of fields, including management studies, organization studies, economics and finance, political science, sociology, psychology, and legal studies, the contributors argue that these models fail to take account of the varied and complex behaviour of actors within the corporation. Instead the cognitive and motivational foundations of governance problems and possible solutions are re-worked to produce a broader conception of governance, and a new range of forms that this can take. The book argues that no one of these forms is the 'solution' to the corporate governance problem. The book contains chapters from leading international management scholars, including: Masahiko Aoki, Margaret Blair, John Child, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Bruno Frey, Anna Grandori, Joseph Lampel, Ryon Lancaster, William Lazonick, Siegwart Lindenberg, Patrick Moreton, Margit Osterloh, Michael Piore, Andrea Prencipe, Suzana Rodrigues, Mark Roe, Giuseppe Soda, Steen Thomsen, Brian Uzzi, Paul Windolf, and Todd Zenger. Corporate Governance and Firm Organizationprovides an important contribution to the corporate governance debate, and will be essential reading for academics and graduate students of corporate governance, business and management, economics, finance, sociology, and law; Consultants, professionals, and policy-makers working in the area of corporate governance.
目录
Contents 8
List of Figures 10
List of Tables 12
Notes on Contributors 14
Introduction. Reframing Corporate Governance: Behavioral Assumptions, Governance Mechanisms, Institutional Dynamics 20
Part I: Contingent Structures and Multiple Rightholders: Co-Designing Governance and Organization 48
1. Comparative Institutional Analysis of Corporate Governance 50
2. The Neglected Benefits of the Corporate Form: Entity Status and the Separation of Asset Ownership from Control 64
3. Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers\u2019 Preferences and Superior Governance Structures 86
4. Corporate Governance in International Joint Ventures: Toward a Theory of Partner Preferences 108
5. Information Intermediaries\u2019 Incentives and Corporate Strategy Choices in the US 132
Part II: Beyond \u2018Control and Alignment\u2019: Non-economic Objectives and Relational Governance 158
6. Economy, Society, and Worker Representation in Corporate Governance 160
7. Corruption, Fraud, and Corporate Governance: A Report on Enron 178
8. Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue 210
9. Myopic Opportunism and Joint Production: A Relational Approach to Corporate Governance 231
10. The Benefit of Doubt: Shadow Norms and Governance in Trust-based Organizations 251
11. The Governance of Innovation: The Case of Rolls-Royce plc 265
Part III: Explaining Difference and Change in Corporate Governance Systems: Beyond the Convergence/Divergence Dilemma 296
12. Explaining Western Securities Markets 298
13. Convergence of Corporate Governance during the Stock Market Bubble: Towards Anglo-American or European Standards? 316
14. The Worldwide Diffusion of Codes of Good Governance 337
15. From Colleague to Employee: Determinants of Changing Career Governance Structures in Elite Law Firms 368
Index 392
A 392
B 393
C 394
D 397
E 398
F 399
G 400
H 401
I 402
J 403
K 404
L 404
M 405
N 407
O 408
P 408
Q 410
R 410
S 411
T 413
U 414
V 415
W 416
X 416
Y 416
Z 416
List of Figures 10
List of Tables 12
Notes on Contributors 14
Introduction. Reframing Corporate Governance: Behavioral Assumptions, Governance Mechanisms, Institutional Dynamics 20
Part I: Contingent Structures and Multiple Rightholders: Co-Designing Governance and Organization 48
1. Comparative Institutional Analysis of Corporate Governance 50
2. The Neglected Benefits of the Corporate Form: Entity Status and the Separation of Asset Ownership from Control 64
3. Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers\u2019 Preferences and Superior Governance Structures 86
4. Corporate Governance in International Joint Ventures: Toward a Theory of Partner Preferences 108
5. Information Intermediaries\u2019 Incentives and Corporate Strategy Choices in the US 132
Part II: Beyond \u2018Control and Alignment\u2019: Non-economic Objectives and Relational Governance 158
6. Economy, Society, and Worker Representation in Corporate Governance 160
7. Corruption, Fraud, and Corporate Governance: A Report on Enron 178
8. Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue 210
9. Myopic Opportunism and Joint Production: A Relational Approach to Corporate Governance 231
10. The Benefit of Doubt: Shadow Norms and Governance in Trust-based Organizations 251
11. The Governance of Innovation: The Case of Rolls-Royce plc 265
Part III: Explaining Difference and Change in Corporate Governance Systems: Beyond the Convergence/Divergence Dilemma 296
12. Explaining Western Securities Markets 298
13. Convergence of Corporate Governance during the Stock Market Bubble: Towards Anglo-American or European Standards? 316
14. The Worldwide Diffusion of Codes of Good Governance 337
15. From Colleague to Employee: Determinants of Changing Career Governance Structures in Elite Law Firms 368
Index 392
A 392
B 393
C 394
D 397
E 398
F 399
G 400
H 401
I 402
J 403
K 404
L 404
M 405
N 407
O 408
P 408
Q 410
R 410
S 411
T 413
U 414
V 415
W 416
X 416
Y 416
Z 416
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