Preface 5
Contents 7
Notes on Contributors 9
1. Introduction: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial 11
1. THE TRIAL UNDER ATTACK 13
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 18
3. A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL? 27
4. WHICH TRIAL, WHOSE TRUTH? 36
2. Changing Conceptions of the Scottish Criminal Trial: The Duty to Agree Uncontroversial Evidence 39
1. INTRODUCTION 39
2. THE JUDGE AS INQUISITOR? 44
3. THE PRINCIPLE OF ORALITY 49
4. AN ADVERSARIAL DEFENCE? 54
5. CONCLUSION 58
3. Ritual, Fairness and Truth: The Adversarial and Inquisitional Models of Criminal Trial 61
1. INTRODUCTION 61
2. PURPOSE OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 63
3. CONCLUSION 78
4. 'More Than Just Illogical': Truth and Jury Nullification 81
1. TRIALS, JURIES, AND NULLIFICATION 82
2. THE TRIAL CONTEXT 87
3. EVALUATING NULLIFICATION 88
4. CONCLUSION 93
5. The Criminal Trial and the Legitimation of Punishment 95
1. THEORIES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96
2. PROCESS WITHOUT TRIAL 98
3. AUTONOMY IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 102
4. EMPATHY AND INDIRECT AUTONOMY 106
5. THE JURY 108
6. A CONTEXTUAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 110
6. Testimony 111
1. TESTIMONY IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEBATE 111
2. LEGAL TESTIMONY 121
7. Managing Uncertainty and Finality: The Function of the Criminal Trial in Legal Inquiry 131
1. INTRODUCTION 131
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 134
3. TRUTH AND FINALITY 135
4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL METHODS OF PROOF 140
5. TOWARDS FREE PROOF? 142
6. THE MODERN ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL 144
7. THE CONTINENTAL ALTERNATIVE 147
8. THE MODERN CRIMINAL TRIAL UNDER CHALLENGE 150
8. Nothing But the Truth? Some Facts, Impressions and Confessions about Truth in Criminal Procedure 157
1. INTRODUCTION 157
2. TRUTH AND THE AIMS OF PROCEDURE 158
3. CORRESPONDENCE V CONSENSUS 160
4. PATHS TO TRUTH 161
5. IMPOSSIBILIUM NULLA EST OBLIGATIO 164
6. RECONSTRUCTION AFTER DECONSTRUCTION 165
9. The Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative 167
1 INTRODUCTION: DESCRIPTION, INTERPRETATION, AND EVALUATION 167
2 AN INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMON LAW TRIAL 169
3 THE ORTHODOX INTERPRETATION: THE RECEIVED VIEW OF THE TRIAL 171
4 THE RHETORICAL DIMENSION OF THE TRIAL 174
5 THE CENTRALITY OF NARRATIVE AT TRIAL: A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY 176
6 EPISTEMOLOGICAL INTERLUDE: WHY THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TRIAL NARRATIVES MATTER 177
7 THE GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE TRIAL 179
8 THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF TRIAL NARRATIVES: THEORY, THEME, AND WITNESS EXAMINATION 180
9 CONCLUSION 186
10. The Objection that Cannot be Heard: Communication and Legitimacy in the Courtroom 189
1. THE UNSEEN 189
2. THE SPECTRE OF SEDITION 193
3. WHAT NORMATIVE UNDERPINNING FOR THE TRIAL? INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND DISCOURSE THEORY 196
4. ALTERA PARS AUDIATUR 200
5. PETITIO PRINCIPII: SELF-REFERENCE AS JUSTIFICATION 205
6. \u2018WE, LAWGIVERS, SUBJECTS\u2019: METONYMIES OF THE FIRST PERSON PLURAL 209
Index 213