Preface\u2014Semiotics in the Seminar 5
Introduction 5
The Kevelson Round Tables 9
The Roberta Kevelson Seminar At Penn State Law 11
Contents 15
Part I: Philosophical Dimensions 17
Introduction 18
Chapter 1: \u201cDie Sache\u201d: The Foundationless Ground of Legal Meaning 21
1.1 A Brief History of Die Sache 24
1.2 Gadamer\u2019s Use of Die Sache 25
1.3 Die Sache and Legal Semiotics 30
1.3.1 Between Positivism and Natural Law 30
1.3.2 The Rule of Law as Practice, Not Ideology 32
1.3.3 The Implications for Legal Education 34
References 35
Chapter 2: Faces Face to Face 37
2.1 Introduction 37
2.1.1 Faces in Legal Semiotics 38
2.1.2 Legal Meaning, Legal Training 38
2.2 Faces and Law 41
2.2.1 Written and Oral Law 41
2.2.2 Lightening Faces 42
2.2.3 Faces Among Faces 44
2.3 Verst盲ndigung 45
2.3.1 Verst盲ndigung vs. Communication 45
2.3.2 Faces as a Learning Aid 46
2.3.3 Identity 47
2.4 Culture 49
2.4.1 Face, Communication 49
2.4.2 The Body as Artifice 51
2.4.3 Faces, Meaning 52
2.5 Thirdness as Artifice 53
2.5.1 Tilda Swinton 54
2.5.2 Orlan 56
2.5.3 Kathleen Bogart 57
2.5.4 Isabelle Dinoire 58
2.5.4.1 Semiotics of Medical Techniques 59
2.6 A World as Thirdness 61
2.6.1 Identity Legal 63
2.6.2 Law, Face 63
2.6.2.1 Animal Symbolicum 64
2.6.3 Bodies, Body Parts in Semiotics 65
2.6.3.1 The Barcelona Case 66
2.6.4 Interaction vs. Interactivity: Three Arguments 67
2.7 Faces Face to Face 69
2.7.1 Semiotics of Interactivity 70
2.7.2 Law in Our Age of Semiotics 70
References 71
Chapter 3: Tarski, Peirce and Truth-Correspondences in Law: Can Semiotic Truth-Analysis Adequately Describe Legal Discourse? 73
3.1 Introduction 73
3.2 The Basic Semiotics: Triadic Relationships and the Concept of Phenotext and Genotext 74
3.2.1 Peirce\u2019s Triadic Relationship 75
3.2.2 Lacan and the Phenotext/Genotext Relationship 76
3.3 Tarski\u2019s Convention-T and Legal Discourse 77
3.3.1 Tarski and Convention-T 77
3.3.2 Convention-T and Legal Discourse 79
3.4 Peircean Truth-Correspondence Theory: An Invitation to the Semiotic 81
3.4.1 The Role of Firstness in Semiotic Analysis 82
3.4.2 Peirce\u2019s Firstness in Truth-Correspondence 83
3.4.3 Peirce\u2019s Truth-Correspondence and Legal Discourse 85
3.5 Conclusion: The Effects of Legal Discourse Upon General Discourse 87
References 88
Part II: History, Law and Semiotics 90
Introduction 91
Chapter 4: History and Semiotics: Preliminary Thoughts 92
References 94
Chapter 5: Teaching Law and Semiotic Sensitivity In the Life and Career of John Reed, Founder of the Dickinson School of Law 96
5.1 The Pennsylvania Blackstone 100
5.2 The Carlisle Printer and Publisher 104
5.3 Blackstone and Reed 105
References 107
Chapter 6: Initiating the Two Legal Cultures of the Early United States: St. George Tucker vs. James Wilson 109
6.1 Introduction 109
6.2 New Law for a Republic 110
6.3 Tucker\u2019s Law Course 112
6.4 Wilson\u2019s Law Course 116
6.5 Footnotes and Structure of the Texts 119
6.6 Tucker\u2019s Virginia and Wilson\u2019s Pennsylvania 121
6.7 Two Traditions in a Deadly Conflict of Laws 122
References 123
Part III: Semiotics and the Legal System 125
Introduction 126
Chapter 7: Common Law Lawyers Should Mind Their Trial Practices: Understanding, Identifying, and Correcting a Semiotic Imbalance 129
7.1 Introduction 129
7.2 Background in Legal Semiotics 130
7.2.1 Peircean Theory of Legal Semiotics 130
7.2.2 Greimassian Theory of Legal Semiotics 132
7.2.3 Lacanian Theory of Legal Semiotics 134
7.3 Semiotic Differences in Both the Understanding and Practice of Law Between the Traditions 135
7.3.1 The Difference in Judicial Authority Renders the Phenotext of the Practicing Lawyer\u2019s Legal Discourse with More Meanings Under the Common Law Tradition 135
7.3.2 Differences in Civil Procedure 138
7.3.3 Differences in Criminal Procedure 140
7.4 When and Why a Semiotic Imbalance Exists, and When It Should Be Corrected 141
7.5 Conclusion 142
References 142
Chapter 8: Semiotics in Legal Theory Design 143
8.1 Introduction 143
8.2 Of Semiotics 144
8.3 Community 145
8.4 Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness 146
8.5 Idea-as-Continuum 147
8.5.1 Discourse/Master Discourse/Speech Acts 148
8.5.2 A Semiotics of Law 149
8.5.3 On the Nature of Law 149
8.5.4 Legal Language 151
8.5.5 Signs/References 151
8.5.6 Legal Discourse 152
8.5.7 Attorneys and Judges 152
8.5.8 Restrictions on Resolutions 153
8.5.9 The Purpose of Law 157
8.6 Legal Subjects and Lived Law 159
8.7 Legal Systems and the Formal Law 160
8.8 Conclusion 164
References 164
Part IV: Gender and Family 166
Introduction 167
Chapter 9: Semiotics of Parenthood in Legal Perspective: Using Semiotic Tools to Deconstruct Legal Determinations of Who Holds Parenthood Obligations and Privileges 170
9.1 Overview 170
9.2 Semiotics 170
9.3 Semiotics in Legal Inquiries 172
9.4 The Relationship Between Signs and Narratives 173
9.5 The Case: Ferguson v. McKiernan 175
9.6 Using a Semiotic Modus Operandi to Analyze Signs 176
9.6.1 Identify the Surface-Level Message 176
9.6.2 Identify the Signifiers 177
9.6.3 Identify the Meaning of, or the Concept Conveyed by, the Signifiers 178
9.6.4 Pair the Surface-Level and Sub-level Signifiers into Dichotomous Relationships 179
9.6.5 Group These Pairs of Surface-Level and Sub-level Signifiers 180
9.6.6 Connect Each Pair with One Other Pair to Form a Semiotic Square 180
9.6.7 Identify the Various Meanings of Each Term 181
9.6.7.1 Interpret Surface-Level Terms 182
9.6.7.2 Interpreting Silence 183
9.6.7.3 Identify Narratives 183
9.6.7.4 A Shift in the Social Master Discourse 184
9.7 \u201cMind the Gap\u201d to Identify the Competing Values 184
9.8 Bridge the Gap 192
References 193
Chapter 10: Michael H. v. Gerald D.: A Case Study of Political Ideology Disguised in Legal Thought 196
10.1 Introduction: The Problem 196
10.2 The Facts 197
10.3 Legal Thought 198
10.3.1 Plurality\u2014Scalia, Joined by Rehnquist, O\u2019Connor and Kennedy 199
10.3.2 Concurrence\u2014O\u2019Connor, Joined by Kennedy 200
10.3.3 Concurrence\u2014Stevens 201
10.3.4 Dissent\u2014Brennan, Joined by Marshall and Blackmun 201
10.4 Dissent\u2014White, Joined by Brennan 202
10.5 Dissent Critiques Plurality 202
10.6 Politics and Ideology 203
10.6.1 Protecting the Child 204
10.6.2 Illegitimacy 204
10.6.3 Multiple Fathers 206
10.7 What Is Family? 207
10.7.1 Protecting Marriage 208
10.7.2 Encouraging Marriage 209
10.8 Conclusion 212
References 212
Part V: Economy, Business 214
Introduction 215
Chapter 11: Trademark s: A Social Perspective 218
11.1 Introduction 218
11.2 Trademarks 218
11.2.1 Trademark Law 219
11.2.2 Protection from Dilution 221
11.2.3 Protection from Trademark Dilution in the European Union 225
11.3 Re-introducing Semiotics in Trademark Law 226
11.4 Semiotic Perspectives on Trademark Law 227
11.5 The Semiotic Significance of Trademarks in Society 229
11.6 Semiotics, Trademarks and Social Distinctions 230
11.7 Conclusion 232
References 232
Chapter 12: Trademarks as a System of Signs: A Semiotician\u2019s Look at Trademark Law 234
12.1 Introduction 234
12.2 Semiotics 235
12.2.1 Greimas and Signification 235
12.2.2 Lacan and Identity 236
12.2.3 Peirce\u2019s Triadic Model 236
12.3 An Introduction to Trademark Law 237
12.4 A Semiotician\u2019s Look at Trademark Law 239
12.5 A Semiotic Analysis of Qualitex 243
12.6 Conclusion 248
References 248
Chapter 13: The Semiotics of \u2018Public Use\u2019: \u201cUse the Purpose by Which All May Benefit\u201d 250
13.1 Semiotics 250
13.2 Legal Applications 254
13.3 The Cases 255
13.4 Conclusion 259
References 260
About the Authors 261
Broekman 261
Butler 261
Cyran 262
Ellsworth 262
Garrett 262
Harvill 263
Karnezos 263
Mootz 263
Pencak 264
Van Fleet 264
Wirth 264
Index 265