简介
Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sector is called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework? In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this question in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world. Contributors: Philippe Aghion, George-Marios Angeletos, Fernando Candia Castillo, Rafael Di Tella, Juan Dubra, Eduardo Engel, Ram n Espinasa, Ronald Fischer, Jeffrey Frankel, Nicol s Gadano, Dieter Helm, William Hogan, Robert MacCulloch, Osmel Manzano, Francisco Monaldi, Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, Erich Muehlegger, Fernando H. Navajas, Robert Pindyck, Luc a Quesada, Roberto Rigobon, Eduardo S. Schwartz, Federico Sturzenegger, Lawrence Summers, Laurence Tai, Michael Tomz, Anders B. Trolle, Louis Wells, Nils Wernerfelt, Mark L. J. Wright, Richard Zeckhauser, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
目录
List of Contributors p. ix
Preface William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger p. xi
1 Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger and Laurence Tai p. 1
I Theoretical Papers p. 45
2 Petroleum Contracts: What Does Contract Theory Tell Us? Philippe Aghion and Luc铆a Quesada p. 47
Commentary Lawrence H. Summers p. 61
3 Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and Expropriation Michael Tomz and Mark L. J. Wright p. 69
Commentary: Expropriations, Defaults, and Financial Architecture Jeromin Zettelmeyer p. 111
4 A Resource Belief Curse? Oil and Individualism Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra and Robert MacCulloch p. 119
Commentary George-Marios Angeletos p. 155
5 Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation Eduardo Engel and Ronald Fischer p. 161
6 Denying the Temptation to GRAB Nils Wernerfelt and Richard Zeckhauser p. 197
7 Dealing with Expropriations: General Guidelines for Oil Production Contracts Roberto Rigobon p. 227
Commentary Erich Muehlegger p. 255
8 Pricing Expropriation Risk in Natural Resource Contracts: A Real Options Approach Eduardo S. Schwartz and Anders B. Trolle p. 263
Commentary Robert Pindyck p. 289
II Country Cases p. 291
9 Credibility, Commitment, and Regulation: Ex Ante Price Caps and Ex Post Interventions Dieter Helm p. 293
Commentary Jeffrey Frankel p. 325
10 Hydrocarbon Policy, Shocks, and the Collective Imagination: What Went Wrong in Bolivia? Fernando H. Navajas p. 331
Commentary Fernando Candia Castillo p. 359
11 Urgency and Betrayal: Three Attempts to Foster Private Investment in Argentina's Oil Industry Nicol谩s Gadano p. 369
Commentary Louis Wells p. 405
12 The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi p. 409
Commentary: Not Just a Distributional Matter Ram贸n Espinasa p. 467
III Conclusion p. 485
Epilogue: Populism and Natural Resources Workshop Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani p. 487
Appendix: Populism and Natural Resources Workshop Participants
List p. 495
Index p. 499
Preface William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger p. xi
1 Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger and Laurence Tai p. 1
I Theoretical Papers p. 45
2 Petroleum Contracts: What Does Contract Theory Tell Us? Philippe Aghion and Luc铆a Quesada p. 47
Commentary Lawrence H. Summers p. 61
3 Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and Expropriation Michael Tomz and Mark L. J. Wright p. 69
Commentary: Expropriations, Defaults, and Financial Architecture Jeromin Zettelmeyer p. 111
4 A Resource Belief Curse? Oil and Individualism Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra and Robert MacCulloch p. 119
Commentary George-Marios Angeletos p. 155
5 Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation Eduardo Engel and Ronald Fischer p. 161
6 Denying the Temptation to GRAB Nils Wernerfelt and Richard Zeckhauser p. 197
7 Dealing with Expropriations: General Guidelines for Oil Production Contracts Roberto Rigobon p. 227
Commentary Erich Muehlegger p. 255
8 Pricing Expropriation Risk in Natural Resource Contracts: A Real Options Approach Eduardo S. Schwartz and Anders B. Trolle p. 263
Commentary Robert Pindyck p. 289
II Country Cases p. 291
9 Credibility, Commitment, and Regulation: Ex Ante Price Caps and Ex Post Interventions Dieter Helm p. 293
Commentary Jeffrey Frankel p. 325
10 Hydrocarbon Policy, Shocks, and the Collective Imagination: What Went Wrong in Bolivia? Fernando H. Navajas p. 331
Commentary Fernando Candia Castillo p. 359
11 Urgency and Betrayal: Three Attempts to Foster Private Investment in Argentina's Oil Industry Nicol谩s Gadano p. 369
Commentary Louis Wells p. 405
12 The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi p. 409
Commentary: Not Just a Distributional Matter Ram贸n Espinasa p. 467
III Conclusion p. 485
Epilogue: Populism and Natural Resources Workshop Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani p. 487
Appendix: Populism and Natural Resources Workshop Participants
List p. 495
Index p. 499
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