Introduction p. 3
A Problem about Luck for Libertarians p. 6
A Modest Libertarian Proposal p. 9
Deciding, the Time of Action, and Free Will p. 14
Agents' Abilities p. 17
Free Will and Neuroscience p. 30
Conceptual Matters p. 31
Libet's Work p. 32
Free Will p. 40
Further Testing p. 42
Conclusion p. 45
Libertarianism, Luck, and Control p. 49
A Task for Libertarians p. 50
Kane on Luck and Control p. 51
O'Connor on Active Power p. 53
Clarke on Agent Causation p. 56
Persisting Intentions and Control p. 61
Luck Remains a Problem p. 63
Some Recent History p. 75
Conclusion p. 76
Frankfurt-style Cases, Luck, and Soft Libertarianism p. 81
Introducing Frankfurt-style Cases and Clarifying PAP p. 82
A Frankfurt-style Story and Alternative Possibilities p. 87
Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases p. 95
A Daring Soft Libertarian Response to Present Luck p. 105
Leeway p. 105
Luck and Modest Libertarianism p. 106
Daring Soft Libertarianism p. 111
Daring Soft Libertarianism and the Problem of Present Luck p. 117
Objections and Replies p. 123
Little Agents p. 129
Conclusion p. 133
Compatibilism: Objections and Replies p. 137
The Consequence Argument p. 137
The Manipulation Argument p. 138
The No-Chance Idea Introduced p. 144
Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility p. 146
Application to the No-Chance Idea, Proposition 2 p. 155
Semicompatibilism and Traditional Compatibilism p. 157
My Compatibilist Proposal: Objections and Replies p. 163
A History-Sensitive Compatibilism p. 164
Dennett's Critique p. 173
Arpaly's Critique p. 179
Kapitan's Critique and the Zygote Argument p. 184
Conclusion p. 195
Conclusion p. 199
Compatibilist and Libertarian Sufficient Conditions for Free Action p. 200
Two Thought Experiments p. 202
Conclusion p. 206
References p. 209
Index p. 217