Cover 1
Half-title 3
Series-title 5
Dedication 6
Title 7
Copyright 8
Contents 9
Acknowledgments 11
Preface 13
1 The Common Sense Tradition 19
1.1 SOME MAIN FEATURES OF THE COMMON SENSE TRADITION 20
1.2 EVIDENCE OR IRRESISTIBILITY? 31
2 Common Sense and Reliability I 42
2.1 TWO ASSUMPTIONS 42
2.2 THE PROBLEM OF CIRCULARITY: ALSTON AND SOSA 54
3 Common Sense and Reliability II 66
3.1 FUMERTON\u2019S OBJECTIONS 66
3.2 VOGEL, ROXANNE, AND THE NEO-MOOREAN ARGUMENT 71
3.3 FURTHER REFLECTIONS AND REFLECTIVE KNOWERS 78
4 Reid, Reliability, and Reid\u2019s Wrong Turn 85
4.1 REID ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE RELIABILITY OF OUR FACULTIES 85
4.2 REID\u2019S WRONG TURN 94
Argument A 100
5 Moore, Skepticism, and the External World 103
5.1 MOORE\u2019S PROOF AND THE CHARGE OF QUESTION-BEGGING 103
5.2 MOORE\u2019S RESPONSE TO SKEPTICISM AND STROUD\u2019S OBJECTION 109
5.3 THE SENSITIVITY REQUIREMENT AND THE CONTEXTUALIST CRITICISM 114
6 Chisholm, Particularism, and Methodism 123
6.1 CHISHOLM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 124
6.2 WHAT\u2019S WRONG WITH METHODISM? 129
Argument A 132
6.3 SUPERVENIENCE AND PARTICULAR EPISTEMIC BELIEFS 134
6.4 MOSER\u2019S CRITICISM OF PARTICULARISM 140
6.5 BONJOUR\u2019S CRITICISM OF PARTICULARISM 147
6.6 BUTCHVAROV\u2019S OBJECTION 150
7 Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology 153
7.1 CHISHOLM ON EPISTEMIC PRINCIPLES AND A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE 154
Argument A 160
Argument B 162
7.2 MODEST A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE 163
7.3 LYCAN\u2019S DEFENSE OF THE MOOREAN RESPONSE TO SKEPTICISM 168
7.4 MODEST A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE AND COMMON SENSE PARTICULARISM 171
8 Particularism, Ethical Skepticism, and Moral Philosophy 175
8.1 SOME CRITICISMS OF WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND PARTICULARISM 180
8.2 JUSTIFIED BELIEF ABOUT PARTICULAR ACTIONS RECONSIDERED 188
Argument A 189
Argument B 193
Conclusion 199
Selected Bibliography 201
Index 205