简介
Summary:
Publisher Summary 1
Defining "a priori knowledge" as the concept of nonexperiential justification in epistemology, Casullo (philosophy, U. of Nebraska at Lincoln) summarizes the arguments between those who believe in the a priori versus those who don't. Operating within the conceptual framework proposed by Immanuel Kant, he argues that proponents of the a priori need to more fully articulate their claims and provide empirical supporting evidence. Finally he examines the relationships between the a priori, the necessary, and the analytic. Annotation (c) Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Publisher Summary 2
The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. Albert Casullo provides a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the controversy. By freeing the a priori from traditional assumptions about the nature of knowledge and justification, he offers a novel approach to resolving these issues which assigns a prominent role to empirical evidence. He concludes by arguing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus primarily on the concepts of necessity and analyticity, are misguided.
目录
Contents 12
Introduction 18
1 The Contemporary Divide 18
2 The Kantian Background 19
3 Synopsis 19
Part I: What Is A Priori Knowledge? 22
1. The Leading Proposals 24
1.1 Introduction 24
1.2 Two Taxonomies 25
1.3 Nonepistemic Analyses 27
1.4 Nonepistemic Conditions 30
1.5 Strength and Defeasibility Conditions 37
1.6 Source Conditions 44
1.7 Conclusion 47
2. Two Conceptions of A Priori Justification 48
2.1 Introduction 48
2.2 Two Competing Demands 49
2.3 General Epistemology 50
2.4 The Supporting Intuitions 52
2.5 The Case for (AP1) 54
2.6 Objections to (AP1) 63
2.7 A Third Conception of A Priori Justification 66
2.8 Conclusion 69
3. Fallible A Priori Justification 71
3.1 Introduction 71
3.2 Two Senses of Infallibility 72
3.3 Three Senses of Fallible A Priori Justification 77
3.4 P-fallibility and A Priori Justification 84
3.5 Two Inconsistent Accounts 87
3.6 Conclusion 92
Part II: Is There A Priori Knowledge? 94
4. The Supporting Arguments 96
4.1 Introduction 96
4.2 Conceptual Arguments 97
4.3 Criterial Arguments: Necessity 105
4.4 Criterial Arguments: Irrefutability 108
4.5 Criterial Arguments: Certainty 112
4.6 Deficiency Arguments 115
4.7 Coherentist Radical Empiricism 119
4.8 Foundationalist Radical Empiricism 123
4.9 Conclusion 125
5. The Opposing Arguments 127
5.1 Introduction 127
5.2 Conceptual Arguments 128
5.3 Radical Empiricist Accounts 136
5.4 Incompatibility Arguments 140
5.5 Philosophical Naturalism 143
5.6 Scientific Naturalism 155
5.7 Conclusion 161
6. Toward a Resolution 162
6.1 Introduction 162
6.2 The Concept of Experience 163
6.3 A Priori Justification 175
6.4 Objections Considered 188
6.5 Conclusion 196
Part III: What Are the Relationships? 198
7. A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth 200
7.1 Introduction 200
7.2 Kant's Strategy 201
7.3 Kripke's Reaction 202
7.4 Complications 209
7.5 Kant Revisited 215
7.6 Rationalism 217
7.7 The Contingent A Priori 220
7.8 Conclusion 224
8. A Priori Knowledge and Analytic Truth 225
8.1 Introduction 225
8.2 Kant's Assumptions 226
8.3 Three Reactions 229
8.4 Rejecting the Synthetic A Priori by Cases 233
8.5 Rejecting the Synthetic A Priori by General Argument 239
8.6 Denying the Cogency of the Distinction 246
8.7 Conclusion 252
Bibliography 254
Index 260
A 260
B 261
C 261
D 261
E 262
F 262
G 262
H 262
I 262
J 262
K 262
L 263
M 263
N 263
O 263
P 263
Q 263
R 263
S 264
T 264
U 264
V 264
W 264
Z 264
Introduction 18
1 The Contemporary Divide 18
2 The Kantian Background 19
3 Synopsis 19
Part I: What Is A Priori Knowledge? 22
1. The Leading Proposals 24
1.1 Introduction 24
1.2 Two Taxonomies 25
1.3 Nonepistemic Analyses 27
1.4 Nonepistemic Conditions 30
1.5 Strength and Defeasibility Conditions 37
1.6 Source Conditions 44
1.7 Conclusion 47
2. Two Conceptions of A Priori Justification 48
2.1 Introduction 48
2.2 Two Competing Demands 49
2.3 General Epistemology 50
2.4 The Supporting Intuitions 52
2.5 The Case for (AP1) 54
2.6 Objections to (AP1) 63
2.7 A Third Conception of A Priori Justification 66
2.8 Conclusion 69
3. Fallible A Priori Justification 71
3.1 Introduction 71
3.2 Two Senses of Infallibility 72
3.3 Three Senses of Fallible A Priori Justification 77
3.4 P-fallibility and A Priori Justification 84
3.5 Two Inconsistent Accounts 87
3.6 Conclusion 92
Part II: Is There A Priori Knowledge? 94
4. The Supporting Arguments 96
4.1 Introduction 96
4.2 Conceptual Arguments 97
4.3 Criterial Arguments: Necessity 105
4.4 Criterial Arguments: Irrefutability 108
4.5 Criterial Arguments: Certainty 112
4.6 Deficiency Arguments 115
4.7 Coherentist Radical Empiricism 119
4.8 Foundationalist Radical Empiricism 123
4.9 Conclusion 125
5. The Opposing Arguments 127
5.1 Introduction 127
5.2 Conceptual Arguments 128
5.3 Radical Empiricist Accounts 136
5.4 Incompatibility Arguments 140
5.5 Philosophical Naturalism 143
5.6 Scientific Naturalism 155
5.7 Conclusion 161
6. Toward a Resolution 162
6.1 Introduction 162
6.2 The Concept of Experience 163
6.3 A Priori Justification 175
6.4 Objections Considered 188
6.5 Conclusion 196
Part III: What Are the Relationships? 198
7. A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth 200
7.1 Introduction 200
7.2 Kant's Strategy 201
7.3 Kripke's Reaction 202
7.4 Complications 209
7.5 Kant Revisited 215
7.6 Rationalism 217
7.7 The Contingent A Priori 220
7.8 Conclusion 224
8. A Priori Knowledge and Analytic Truth 225
8.1 Introduction 225
8.2 Kant's Assumptions 226
8.3 Three Reactions 229
8.4 Rejecting the Synthetic A Priori by Cases 233
8.5 Rejecting the Synthetic A Priori by General Argument 239
8.6 Denying the Cogency of the Distinction 246
8.7 Conclusion 252
Bibliography 254
Index 260
A 260
B 261
C 261
D 261
E 262
F 262
G 262
H 262
I 262
J 262
K 262
L 263
M 263
N 263
O 263
P 263
Q 263
R 263
S 264
T 264
U 264
V 264
W 264
Z 264
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