Field's Response
There Are No Mathematical Objects
Mathematics is Theoretically Dispensable: Realism and anti-realism in mathematics Hartry Field
Is mathematical knowledge just logical knowledge? Hartry Field
Review of science without numbers: a defense of nominalism David Malament
Conservativeness and incompleteness Stewart Shapiro
Synthetic mechanics John P. Burgess
Another Anti-Realist Response: Mathematics is Really Talk About Possibilities Involving Concrete Objects: A simple type theory without Platonic domains Charles S. Chihara
Arithmetic for the Millian Philip Kitcher
Maddy's Realism: Mathematical Objects are like Ordinary Concrete Objects and Known by Similar Means: Physicalistic Platonism Penelope Maddy
Perception and mathematical intuition Penelope Maddy
A G枚delian thesis regarding mathematical objects: do they exist? And can we perceive them? Charles S. Chihara
Other Approaches to realism: Truth and proof: the Platonism of mathematics W.W. Tait
Why numbers can believably be: a reply to Hartry Field Crispin Wright
Second-Order Logic: a New Tool for Logistics and Other Mathematical Reductionists?: To be is to be a value of a variable (or to be some values of some variables) George Boolos
Nominalist Platonism George Boolos
Saving Frege from contradiction George Boolos
Second-order logic still wild Michael D. Resnik
Second-order logic, foundations and rules Stewart Shapiro
Structuralism: Mathematics Studies Structures: Mathematics as a science of patterns: ontology and reference Michael D. Resnick
A naturalized epistemology for a Platonist mathematical ontology Michael D. Resnik
Structure and ontology Stewart Shapiro
Modal-structures mathematics Geoffrey Hellman
The structuralist view of mathematical objects Charles Parsons
New Approaches to Mathematical Intuition: Mathematical intuition Charles Parsons
Phenomenology and mathematical knowledge Richard Tieszen