简介
How is free will possible in the light of the physical and chemical underpinnings of brain activity and recent neurobiological experiments? How can the emergence of complexity in hierarchical systems such as the brain, based at the lower levels in physical interactions, lead to something like genuine free will? The nature of our understanding of free will in the light of present-day neuroscience is becoming increasingly important because of remarkable discoveries on the topic being made by neuroscientists at the present time, on the one hand, and its crucial importance for the way we view ourselves as human beings, on the other. A key tool in understanding how free will may arise in this context is the idea of downward causation in complex systems, happening coterminously with bottom up causation, to form an integral whole. Top-down causation is usually neglected, and is therefore emphasized in the other part of the book鈥檚 title. The concept is explored in depth, as are the ethical and legal implications of our understanding of free will. This book arises out of a workshop held in California in April of 2007, which was chaired by Dr. Christof Koch. It was unusual in terms of the breadth of people involved: they included physicists, neuroscientists, psychiatrists, philosophers, and theologians. This enabled the meeting, and hence the resulting book, to attain a rather broader perspective on the issue than is often attained at academic symposia. The book includes contributions by Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, George F. R. Ellis , Christopher D. Frith, Mark Hallett, David Hodgson, Owen D. Jones, Alicia Juarrero, J. A. Scott Kelso, Christof Koch, Hans K眉ng, Hakwan C. Lau, Dean Mobbs, Nancey Murphy, William Newsome, Timothy O鈥機onnor, Sean A.. Spence, and Evan Thompson.
目录
UCS 0003 1
Preface 5
Contents 6
Introduction and Overview 8
Historical Debates 8
The Stalled Free-Will Debate 9
Reductionism, Emergence, and Downward Causation 11
Is Conscious Will an Illusion? 15
Overview of the Volume 16
Analysis of the Volume 32
References 35
Part I Physics, Emergence, and Complex Systems 36
Free Will, Physics, Biology, and the Brain 37
Free Will Comes in Different Shades: Strong versus Pragmatic 39
Physics and Choice: The Clockwork Universe 40
The Demise of the Clockwork Universe 44
The Impoverished Freedom of the Mind to Realize One Quantum Event over Another 47
Brains, Animals, and Randomness 48
The Cognitive Science of Willful Intention 51
Agency or the Conscious Experience of Will 52
Taking Stock of the Situation 55
References 56
Human Freedom and \u201cEmergence\u201d 59
A Caveat 67
Concluding Remarks 67
References 68
Top-Down Causation and the Human Brain 69
Causation as the Core of Science 69
Functional Context: Modular Hierarchical Structures 71
Modularity 71
Hierarchy 71
Bottom-Up Causation 71
Top-Down Causation 72
Algorithmic Top-Down Causation 73
Nonadaptive Information Control 74
Adaptive Selection 75
Adaptive Information Control 77
Intelligent Top-Down Causation 78
Freedom at the Bottom? 80
Multiple Categories of Causation 82
Conclusion 84
References 85
Top-Down Causation and Autonomy in Complex Systems 88
Introduction 88
Dynamical Systems Theory 89
No Constraints 89
Bottom-Up Integration 89
Constraints 90
Integration, Not Fusion 91
Emergent Properties 92
Minimal Functionality 93
Top-Down Causation 94
Autocatalysis 96
Selection Process 98
Criteria of Suitability: Semiosis 99
Summary Thus Far 100
Biological Function 101
Individuation 102
Free Will 103
Further Research: Boundaries 104
References 105
Toward a Complementary Neuroscience: Metastable Coordination Dynamics of the Brain 108
Prolegomenon 108
Toward a Complementary Science 109
Toward a Complementary Brain Science 110
Coordination Dynamics of the Brain: Multistability, Phase Transitions, and Metastability 111
The Extended HKB Model 113
Metastability in the Brain 118
Clarifying Nonlinear Brain Dynamics: The Freeman-Kelso Dialogue 120
A Short Afterthought 123
References 125
Part II Volition and Consciousness: Are They Illusions? 130
Physiology of Volition 131
Definition of Terms 131
Disorders of Volition 132
A Model for Voluntary Movement 133
Motivation and Planning 134
Voluntary Movement without Prior Consciousness 135
Timing of the Perception of Volition 136
Criticisms of the \u201cLibet Clock\u201d Experiment 138
Events in the Immediate Premovement Period 140
Dissociating the Timing of the Sense of Volition and the Actual Movement 140
Sense of Volition Depends on Sense of Causality 141
Anatomy of the Sense of Volition 141
Anatomy of the Sense of Agency 142
Conclusions 144
References 144
How We Recognize Our Own Actions 148
Forward Models and Prediction of Action 148
Why Can\u2019t You Tickle Yourself? 148
Actions Can Be Unavailable to Awareness 150
Abnormalities in the Control and Awareness of Action 151
Parietal Lobe Lesions 151
Delusions of Control/Passivity Experiences Associated with Schizophrenia 151
Phantom Limbs 152
Conclusion 153
References 153
Volition and the Function of Consciousness 155
Introduction 155
Spontaneous Motor Initiation 156
Conscious Veto? 159
Exclusion and Inhibition 161
Top-Down Cognitive Control 163
How to Find the True Function of Consciousness? 165
Conclusion 168
References 169
Part III Broader Understandings of Volition and Consciousness 172
Conscious Willing and the Emerging Sciences of Brain and Behavior 173
The Sciences of Volition and Agency: Empirical Challenges to Free Will on Three Fronts 175
Some Conceptual Tools in Aid of Deflating Some of the Challenges 178
Ex Post Facto Confabulation 179
Erroneous Beliefs Concerning the Wider Effects of One\u2019s Actions 179
Automatisms: Minimally Voluntary Actions Unaccompanied by Any Feeling of Agency 180
Libet Cases 181
Philosophical and Scientific Models of the Will: Towards an Interface 182
References 186
Contemplative Neuroscience as an Approach to Volitional Consciousness 187
Toward a Neurophenomenology of Volition 188
Meditation and Neurodynamics 191
Emergence 193
Volition as Intervention 194
Conclusion 195
References 195
Free Will and Top-Down Control in the Brain 198
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Processes in Attention 199
Psychological and Physiological Definitions of Top-Down Control 200
Free Will in the Brain: Where Is the Top in Top-Down Control? 201
Action Initiation and Action Selection 204
Will as a Social Endeavor 206
References 207
Thinking beyond the Bereitschaftspotential: Consciousness of Self and Others as a Necessary Condition for Change 209
The Problem 210
Are We Responsible but Not in Control? 210
Respecting Our Automatisms 212
Blaming People and Passing Judgment 213
Trying to Do the Right Thing 216
Becoming \u201cOurselves\u201d 216
The Unknowing Altruism of Others 217
Doing Things in Front of Others 218
A Very Physical Redemption 219
References 220
Part IV Human Implications of the Debate 222
Criminal Responsibility, Free Will, and Neuroscience 223
Retributive and Consequentialist Purposes 224
Arguments against Retributivism 226
Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility 227
Virtues of Retribution 228
Three Ways to Maintain Retribution 230
The Role of Neuroscience 233
References 236
Law, Responsibility, and the Brain 238
Studies of the Prefrontal Cortex in Antisocial and Violent Populations 239
Beyond the PFC 241
Does the Crime Fit the Brain? 242
Does Some Criminal Behavior Result from Mental Disorder? 243
Possible Legal Implications 244
The Limits of Brain Imaging as Evidence 247
Concluding Remarks 249
References 252
The Controversy over Brain Research 256
Determined by Physical-Chemical Brain Processes? 256
Is Free Will an Illusion? 257
The Trivialization of Responsibility and Guilt by the Neurosciences 258
The Limits of Brain Research 260
The Big Questions of the Neurosciences 261
Chemistry and Physics Do Not Explain the Self 262
Experience of Freedom 263
References 265
Author Index 266
Preface 5
Contents 6
Introduction and Overview 8
Historical Debates 8
The Stalled Free-Will Debate 9
Reductionism, Emergence, and Downward Causation 11
Is Conscious Will an Illusion? 15
Overview of the Volume 16
Analysis of the Volume 32
References 35
Part I Physics, Emergence, and Complex Systems 36
Free Will, Physics, Biology, and the Brain 37
Free Will Comes in Different Shades: Strong versus Pragmatic 39
Physics and Choice: The Clockwork Universe 40
The Demise of the Clockwork Universe 44
The Impoverished Freedom of the Mind to Realize One Quantum Event over Another 47
Brains, Animals, and Randomness 48
The Cognitive Science of Willful Intention 51
Agency or the Conscious Experience of Will 52
Taking Stock of the Situation 55
References 56
Human Freedom and \u201cEmergence\u201d 59
A Caveat 67
Concluding Remarks 67
References 68
Top-Down Causation and the Human Brain 69
Causation as the Core of Science 69
Functional Context: Modular Hierarchical Structures 71
Modularity 71
Hierarchy 71
Bottom-Up Causation 71
Top-Down Causation 72
Algorithmic Top-Down Causation 73
Nonadaptive Information Control 74
Adaptive Selection 75
Adaptive Information Control 77
Intelligent Top-Down Causation 78
Freedom at the Bottom? 80
Multiple Categories of Causation 82
Conclusion 84
References 85
Top-Down Causation and Autonomy in Complex Systems 88
Introduction 88
Dynamical Systems Theory 89
No Constraints 89
Bottom-Up Integration 89
Constraints 90
Integration, Not Fusion 91
Emergent Properties 92
Minimal Functionality 93
Top-Down Causation 94
Autocatalysis 96
Selection Process 98
Criteria of Suitability: Semiosis 99
Summary Thus Far 100
Biological Function 101
Individuation 102
Free Will 103
Further Research: Boundaries 104
References 105
Toward a Complementary Neuroscience: Metastable Coordination Dynamics of the Brain 108
Prolegomenon 108
Toward a Complementary Science 109
Toward a Complementary Brain Science 110
Coordination Dynamics of the Brain: Multistability, Phase Transitions, and Metastability 111
The Extended HKB Model 113
Metastability in the Brain 118
Clarifying Nonlinear Brain Dynamics: The Freeman-Kelso Dialogue 120
A Short Afterthought 123
References 125
Part II Volition and Consciousness: Are They Illusions? 130
Physiology of Volition 131
Definition of Terms 131
Disorders of Volition 132
A Model for Voluntary Movement 133
Motivation and Planning 134
Voluntary Movement without Prior Consciousness 135
Timing of the Perception of Volition 136
Criticisms of the \u201cLibet Clock\u201d Experiment 138
Events in the Immediate Premovement Period 140
Dissociating the Timing of the Sense of Volition and the Actual Movement 140
Sense of Volition Depends on Sense of Causality 141
Anatomy of the Sense of Volition 141
Anatomy of the Sense of Agency 142
Conclusions 144
References 144
How We Recognize Our Own Actions 148
Forward Models and Prediction of Action 148
Why Can\u2019t You Tickle Yourself? 148
Actions Can Be Unavailable to Awareness 150
Abnormalities in the Control and Awareness of Action 151
Parietal Lobe Lesions 151
Delusions of Control/Passivity Experiences Associated with Schizophrenia 151
Phantom Limbs 152
Conclusion 153
References 153
Volition and the Function of Consciousness 155
Introduction 155
Spontaneous Motor Initiation 156
Conscious Veto? 159
Exclusion and Inhibition 161
Top-Down Cognitive Control 163
How to Find the True Function of Consciousness? 165
Conclusion 168
References 169
Part III Broader Understandings of Volition and Consciousness 172
Conscious Willing and the Emerging Sciences of Brain and Behavior 173
The Sciences of Volition and Agency: Empirical Challenges to Free Will on Three Fronts 175
Some Conceptual Tools in Aid of Deflating Some of the Challenges 178
Ex Post Facto Confabulation 179
Erroneous Beliefs Concerning the Wider Effects of One\u2019s Actions 179
Automatisms: Minimally Voluntary Actions Unaccompanied by Any Feeling of Agency 180
Libet Cases 181
Philosophical and Scientific Models of the Will: Towards an Interface 182
References 186
Contemplative Neuroscience as an Approach to Volitional Consciousness 187
Toward a Neurophenomenology of Volition 188
Meditation and Neurodynamics 191
Emergence 193
Volition as Intervention 194
Conclusion 195
References 195
Free Will and Top-Down Control in the Brain 198
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Processes in Attention 199
Psychological and Physiological Definitions of Top-Down Control 200
Free Will in the Brain: Where Is the Top in Top-Down Control? 201
Action Initiation and Action Selection 204
Will as a Social Endeavor 206
References 207
Thinking beyond the Bereitschaftspotential: Consciousness of Self and Others as a Necessary Condition for Change 209
The Problem 210
Are We Responsible but Not in Control? 210
Respecting Our Automatisms 212
Blaming People and Passing Judgment 213
Trying to Do the Right Thing 216
Becoming \u201cOurselves\u201d 216
The Unknowing Altruism of Others 217
Doing Things in Front of Others 218
A Very Physical Redemption 219
References 220
Part IV Human Implications of the Debate 222
Criminal Responsibility, Free Will, and Neuroscience 223
Retributive and Consequentialist Purposes 224
Arguments against Retributivism 226
Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility 227
Virtues of Retribution 228
Three Ways to Maintain Retribution 230
The Role of Neuroscience 233
References 236
Law, Responsibility, and the Brain 238
Studies of the Prefrontal Cortex in Antisocial and Violent Populations 239
Beyond the PFC 241
Does the Crime Fit the Brain? 242
Does Some Criminal Behavior Result from Mental Disorder? 243
Possible Legal Implications 244
The Limits of Brain Imaging as Evidence 247
Concluding Remarks 249
References 252
The Controversy over Brain Research 256
Determined by Physical-Chemical Brain Processes? 256
Is Free Will an Illusion? 257
The Trivialization of Responsibility and Guilt by the Neurosciences 258
The Limits of Brain Research 260
The Big Questions of the Neurosciences 261
Chemistry and Physics Do Not Explain the Self 262
Experience of Freedom 263
References 265
Author Index 266
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