简介
This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
目录
Static Games of Complete Information p. 1
Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium p. 2
Normal-Form Representation of Games p. 2
Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies p. 4
Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin p. 8
Applications p. 14
Cournot Model of Duopoly p. 14
Bertrand Model of Duopoly p. 21
Final-Offer Arbitration p. 22
The Problem of the Commons p. 27
Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibriutn p. 29
Mixed Strategies p. 29
Existence of Nash Equilibrium p. 33
Dynamic Games of Complete Information p. 55
Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information p. 57
Theory: Backwards Induction p. 57
Stackelberg Model of Duopoly p. 61
Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm p. 64
Sequential Bargaining p. 68
Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information p. 71
Theory: Subgame Perfection p. 71
Bank Runs p. 73
Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition p. 75
Tournaments p. 79
Repeated Games p. 82
Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games p. 82
Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games p. 88
Collusion between Cournot Duopolists p. 102
Efficiency Wages p. 107
Time-Consistent Monetary Policy p. 112
Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information p. 115
Extensive-Form Representation of Games p. 115
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin p. 122
Static Games of Incomplete Information p. 143
Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium p. 144
An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information p. 144
Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games p. 146
Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium p. 149
Applications p. 152
Mixed Strategies Revisited p. 152
An Auction p. 155
A Double Auction p. 158
The Revelation Principle p. 164
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information p. 173
Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium p. 175
Signaling Games p. 183
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games p. 183
Job-Market Signaling p. 190
Corporate Investment and Capital Structure p. 205
Monetary Policy p. 208
Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium p. 210
Cheap-Talk Games p. 210
Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information p. 218
Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia p. 224
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium p. 233
Index p. 257
Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium p. 2
Normal-Form Representation of Games p. 2
Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies p. 4
Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin p. 8
Applications p. 14
Cournot Model of Duopoly p. 14
Bertrand Model of Duopoly p. 21
Final-Offer Arbitration p. 22
The Problem of the Commons p. 27
Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibriutn p. 29
Mixed Strategies p. 29
Existence of Nash Equilibrium p. 33
Dynamic Games of Complete Information p. 55
Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information p. 57
Theory: Backwards Induction p. 57
Stackelberg Model of Duopoly p. 61
Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm p. 64
Sequential Bargaining p. 68
Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information p. 71
Theory: Subgame Perfection p. 71
Bank Runs p. 73
Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition p. 75
Tournaments p. 79
Repeated Games p. 82
Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games p. 82
Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games p. 88
Collusion between Cournot Duopolists p. 102
Efficiency Wages p. 107
Time-Consistent Monetary Policy p. 112
Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information p. 115
Extensive-Form Representation of Games p. 115
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin p. 122
Static Games of Incomplete Information p. 143
Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium p. 144
An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information p. 144
Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games p. 146
Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium p. 149
Applications p. 152
Mixed Strategies Revisited p. 152
An Auction p. 155
A Double Auction p. 158
The Revelation Principle p. 164
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information p. 173
Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium p. 175
Signaling Games p. 183
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games p. 183
Job-Market Signaling p. 190
Corporate Investment and Capital Structure p. 205
Monetary Policy p. 208
Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium p. 210
Cheap-Talk Games p. 210
Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information p. 218
Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia p. 224
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium p. 233
Index p. 257
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