简介
Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not a matter of their being ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypothetical consensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature. Shafer-Landau accepts Platos and Moores contention that moral truths are sui generic. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow their counsel. Moral Realism is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning the foundations of ethics. - Back cover.
目录
Introduction p. 1
Realism and Its Critics
The Non-cognitivist Challenge p. 13
What Moral Realism Is p. 13
The Non-cognitivist Challenge p. 18
A Critique of Non-cognitivism p. 22
Conclusion p. 37
The Constructivist Challenge p. 39
Subjectivism and Objectivism p. 39
Moral and Non-moral Constraints p. 41
Four Constructivist Critiques p. 44
Conclusion p. 51
Moral Metaphysics
Ethical Non-naturalism p. 55
Moore's Argument p. 56
Naturalism and Non-naturalism p. 58
Against Classical Naturalism p. 65
Non-naturalistic Metaphysics p. 72
Conclusion p. 79
Supervenience and Causation p. 80
Metaphysical Worries p. 80
The First Supervenience Argument p. 84
The Second Supervenience Argument p. 89
The Causal Argument p. 98
Conclusion p. 114
Moral Motivation
Motivational Humeanism p. 119
The Non-cognitivist Argument p. 119
The Attractions of Anti-Humeanism p. 122
Five Humean Arguments p. 127
Conclusion p. 140
Motivational Judgement Internalism p. 142
A Taxonomy of Internalisms p. 142
The Amoralist p. 145
An Objection p. 147
The Examples p. 148
Internalist Worries p. 155
Conclusion p. 161
Moral Reasons
Reasons Internalism p. 165
The Scope of Practical Reason p. 165
Varieties of Reasons Internalism p. 171
Arguments for Reasons Internalism p. 176
Two Arguments against Internalism p. 185
Conclusion p. 188
Moral Rationalism p. 190
Realism and Rationalism p. 190
A Presumptive Argument for Moral Rationalism p. 192
Four Antirationalist Arguments p. 193
Partners in Crime p. 209
Conclusion p. 211
Rationality and Disagreement p. 215
The Argument from Disagreement p. 215
Explaining Actual Disagreement p. 218
Explaining Hypothesized Disagreement p. 221
Conclusion p. 227
Moral Knowledge
Moral Scepticism p. 231
The Master Argument p. 231
Realism and Epistemic Inaccessibility p. 232
Four Sceptical Arguments p. 235
Believing Where We Cannot Prove p. 241
Conclusion p. 245
The Justification of Moral Principles p. 247
The Appeal to Self-Evidence p. 247
Objections to Self-Evidence p. 250
Conclusion p. 265
The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs p. 267
Three Models of Ethical Theory p. 267
Moral Reliabilism p. 272
Objections to Moral Reliabilism p. 275
Identifying Reliable Processes: Some Preliminaries p. 293
Identifying Reliable Processes: The Role of Exemplars p. 296
Conclusion p. 300
References p. 303
Realism and Its Critics
The Non-cognitivist Challenge p. 13
What Moral Realism Is p. 13
The Non-cognitivist Challenge p. 18
A Critique of Non-cognitivism p. 22
Conclusion p. 37
The Constructivist Challenge p. 39
Subjectivism and Objectivism p. 39
Moral and Non-moral Constraints p. 41
Four Constructivist Critiques p. 44
Conclusion p. 51
Moral Metaphysics
Ethical Non-naturalism p. 55
Moore's Argument p. 56
Naturalism and Non-naturalism p. 58
Against Classical Naturalism p. 65
Non-naturalistic Metaphysics p. 72
Conclusion p. 79
Supervenience and Causation p. 80
Metaphysical Worries p. 80
The First Supervenience Argument p. 84
The Second Supervenience Argument p. 89
The Causal Argument p. 98
Conclusion p. 114
Moral Motivation
Motivational Humeanism p. 119
The Non-cognitivist Argument p. 119
The Attractions of Anti-Humeanism p. 122
Five Humean Arguments p. 127
Conclusion p. 140
Motivational Judgement Internalism p. 142
A Taxonomy of Internalisms p. 142
The Amoralist p. 145
An Objection p. 147
The Examples p. 148
Internalist Worries p. 155
Conclusion p. 161
Moral Reasons
Reasons Internalism p. 165
The Scope of Practical Reason p. 165
Varieties of Reasons Internalism p. 171
Arguments for Reasons Internalism p. 176
Two Arguments against Internalism p. 185
Conclusion p. 188
Moral Rationalism p. 190
Realism and Rationalism p. 190
A Presumptive Argument for Moral Rationalism p. 192
Four Antirationalist Arguments p. 193
Partners in Crime p. 209
Conclusion p. 211
Rationality and Disagreement p. 215
The Argument from Disagreement p. 215
Explaining Actual Disagreement p. 218
Explaining Hypothesized Disagreement p. 221
Conclusion p. 227
Moral Knowledge
Moral Scepticism p. 231
The Master Argument p. 231
Realism and Epistemic Inaccessibility p. 232
Four Sceptical Arguments p. 235
Believing Where We Cannot Prove p. 241
Conclusion p. 245
The Justification of Moral Principles p. 247
The Appeal to Self-Evidence p. 247
Objections to Self-Evidence p. 250
Conclusion p. 265
The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs p. 267
Three Models of Ethical Theory p. 267
Moral Reliabilism p. 272
Objections to Moral Reliabilism p. 275
Identifying Reliable Processes: Some Preliminaries p. 293
Identifying Reliable Processes: The Role of Exemplars p. 296
Conclusion p. 300
References p. 303
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