简介
Summary:
Publisher Summary 1
The second edition of Dr. Demski's book reflects his experiences teaching undergraduates, masters and doctoral students. He emphasizes economic fundamentals as the guiding foundation coupled with an artful application of those fundamentals. This applies to product costing, decision making and evaluation art. Dr. Demski has also removed a great deal of traditional minutiae, in order to keep this theme in constant focus. This thematic approach, in his experience, works in dramatic fashion, and stands in sharp contrast to more traditional presentations of this material. The book is not only for use as a textbook but also as a reference book.
目录
Table Of Contents:
Preface xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Accounting Resources 2
1.2 Modes of Study 4
1.3 Ingredients for an Interesting Stew 6
1.4 Overview 8
1.5 Summary 10
1.6 Bibliographic Notes 10
2 Economic Foundations: The Single Product Firm 11
2.1 Perfect Markets 12
2.2 The Firm Straddles Markets 12
2.3 The Economic Cost Function 15
2.3.1 Cost Function Terminology 16
2.3.2 A Closer Look at the Cost Function 18
2.4 Shadow Prices 21
2.5 Cost and Revenue Framing 23
2.6 Short-Run versus Long-Run Cost 24
2.7 Summary 27
2.8 Appendix: Constrained Optimization and Shadow Prices 29
2.9 Bibliographic Notes 31
2.10 Problems and Exercises 31
3 Economic Foundations: The Multiproduct Firm 35
3.1 Back to Perfect Markets 36
3.1.1 What is a Good or Service 36
3.1.2 Present Value 36
3.2 The Multiproduct Firm 38
3.3 The Multiproduct Cost Function 39
3.3.1 Cost Function Terminology 40
3.3.2 Cost Function Separability 41
3.3.3 Ubiquity of Marginal Cost 46
3.4 A Multiperiod Interpretation 48
3.4.1 Present Value to the Rescue 49
3.4.2 The Multiperiod Cost Function 50
3.5 Summary 52
3.6 Bibliographic Notes 52
3.7 Problems and Exercises 53
4 Accounting versus Economics 59
4.1 Back to the Multiproduct, Single Period Firm 60
4.1.1 The Economic Story 61
4.1.2 The Accounting Story 61
4.1.3 Per Unit Product Costs 65
4.2 The Underlying Recipe 67
4.3 The Multiperiod Case 69
4.3.1 The Economic Story 69
4.3.2 The Accounting Story 74
4.4 Accounting Conventions 75
4.5 Summary 77
4.6 Bibliographic Notes 78
4.7 Problems and Exercises 78
5 A Closer Look at the Accountant's Art 83
5.1 An Extended Illustration 84
5.1.1 One Among Many Answers 86
5.1.2 Central Features of the Construction 89
5.2 Unit Costing Art 92
5.2.1 Aggregation 93
5.2.2 Linear Approximation 93
5.2.3 Cost Allocation 97
5.3 The Constructive Procedure 99
5.4 Short-Run versus Long-Run Marginal Cost 100
5.5 Summary 103
5.6 Bibliographic Notes 104
5.7 Problems and Exercises 104
6 The Impressionism School 111
6.1 More Terminology 112
6.2 Data for an Extended Illustration 113
6.3 Assignment of Actual Overhead Totals 114
6.4 Assignment of Estimated Overhead Totals 116
6.4.1 Normal, Full Costing 116
6.4.2 Normal, Variable Cost 121
6.4.3 Remarks 124
6.5 Standard Cost Systems 125
6.6 Summary 127
6.7 Bibliographic Notes 128
6.8 Problems and Exercises 128
7 The Modernism School 137
7.1 Variations on a Theme 138
7.2 The Underlying Structure 143
7.3 Back to the Firm's Technology 144
7.3.1 Marginal Costs 146
7.3.2 Impressionism's Answer 146
7.3.3 ABC's Answer 147
7.3.4 Back to Marginal Costs 150
7.4 Numerical Explorations 152
7.4.1 Decreasing Returns 152
7.4.2 Increasing Returns 153
7.4.3 Mixed Case 156
7.5 Portfolio of Errors 156
7.6 Summary 161
7.7 Bibliographic Notes 162
7.8 Problems and Exercises 163
8 Consistent Decision Framing 167
8.1 Economic Rationality 168
8.1.1 Consistency 170
8.1.2 Smoothness 171
8.1.3 Consistent Framing 172
8.2 Irrelevance of Increasing Transformations 173
8.3 Local Searches are Possible 176
8.3.1 The Economist's Approach 179
8.3.2 Shadow Prices 180
8.4 Component Searches are Possible 182
8.4.1 Cost Functions 183
8.4.2 The General Idea 183
8.4.3 Interactions 184
8.5 Consistent Framing 187
8.6 Summary 187
8.7 Bibliographic Notes 188
8.8 Problems and Exercises 188
9 Consistent Framing under Uncertainty 195
9.1 Explicit Uncertainty 196
9.1.1 Choices as Lotteries 196
9.1.2 Choices as State Dependent Outcomes 197
9.2 Consistent Choice with Probabilities 198
9.2.1 Scaling 200
9.2.2 Consistency, Smoothness and Independence 201
9.3 Certainty Equivalents 201
9.3.1 A Convenient Transformation 202
9.3.2 A Special Case 203
9.4 Risk Aversion 204
9.5 Information 207
9.6 An Important Aside 211
9.7 Summary 212
9.8 Bibliographic Notes 213
9.9 Problems and Exercises 213
10 Consistent Framing in a Strategic Setting 221
10.1 Equilibrium Behavior 222
10.1.1 Simultaneous Choice 223
10.1.2 Sequential Choice 224
10.1.3 Repeated Choice 225
10.2 Sharing a Market 226
10.3 Racing to Capture a Market 228
10.4 Bidding for a Prize 229
10.4.1 Uninformed Bidders 230
10.4.2 Equilibrium Bidding with Private Information 231
10.4.3 Winner's Curse 234
10.5 Haggling 239
10.5.1 Milquetoast Players 239
10.5.2 Private Cost Information 240
10.6 Internal Control 242
10.6.1 Decision Rights 243
10.6.2 Redundancy 244
10.6.3 Explicit Incentives 244
10.6.4 Equilibrium Behavior 245
10.7 Summary 245
10.8 Bibliographic Notes 246
10.9 Problems and Exercises 247
11 Large versus Small Decisions: Short-Run 253
11.1 Preliminaries 254
11.1.1 Break-Even Analysis 254
11.1.2 Framing Subtleties 257
11.2 Make or Buy 262
11.2.1 A Two Product Illustration 262
11.2.2 An Unusual Offer 264
11.3 Product Evaluation 267
11.4 Customer Evaluation 269
11.5 Uncertainty 270
11.5.1 Option Value of Flexibility 270
11.5.2 Cost of Risk 271
11.6 Interaction with Taxes 274
11.7 Summary 275
11.8 Bibliographic Notes 276
11.9 Problems and Exercises 276
12 Large versus Small Decisions: Long-Run 287
12.1 Back to Present Value 288
12.2 Present Value Pretenders 292
12.2.1 Internal Rate of Return 292
12.2.2 Payback 295
12.2.3 Framing 296
12.3 Cash Flow Estimation 297
12.3.1 An Earlier Story 298
12.3.2 The Proposed Project 299
12.3.3 Is this a Large Decision? 299
12.4 Rendering in the Accounting Library 303
12.4.1 Accounting Rate of Return 305
12.4.2 Closing the Gap 305
12.5 Summary 308
12.6 Bibliographic Notes 309
12.7 Problems and Exercises 309
13 Economic Foundations: Performance Evaluation 315
13.1 Performance Evaluation 315
13.2 A Streamlined Production Setting 318
13.2.1 Managerial Service 318
13.2.2 Preferences of the Supplier 319
13.3 Transacting with a Perfect Labor Market 321
13.4 Transacting in the Face of Market Frictions 322
13.4.1 Self-Interested Behavior 322
13.4.2 Public Observation of Input 324
13.4.3 Limited Public Information 325
13.5 The Bad News 331
13.5.1 Trivial Managerial Risk Aversion 331
13.5.2 Trivial Odds of Low Output under Input H 332
13.5.3 Trivial Incremental Personal Cost 333
13.5.4 The Unavoidable Conclusion 334
13.6 A More Expansive View 335
13.7 Summary 336
13.8 Bibliographic Notes 337
13.9 Problems and Exercises 338
14 Economic Foundations: Informative Performance Evaluation 343
14.1 Slightly Expanded Setting 343
14.2 A Convenient Transformation 345
14.3 Informativeness 347
14.3.1 How the Model Uses the Information 350
14.3.2 The Informativeness Criterion 353
14.4 Larger Picture 356
14.5 Summary 357
14.6 Bibliographic Notes 358
14.7 Problems and Exercises 358
15 Allocation Among Tasks 363
15.1 Allocation of Total Input 364
15.1.1 An Extreme Case 366
15.1.2 More Information 368
15.2 Balanced Attention to the Two Tasks 371
15.2.1 Expanded Control Problem 371
15.2.2 More Information (again) 372
15.3 Insight into the Performance Evaluation Game 375
15.3.1 Good Information Drives out Bad Information 375
15.3.2 Bad Information Drives out Good Information 377
15.3.3 Task Assignment Matters 378
15.3.4 Intertemporal Balance 379
15.4 Stepping Back 379
15.5 Summary 381
15.6 Bibliographic Notes 381
15.7 Problems and Exercises 381
16 Accounting-Based Performance Evaluation 389
16.1 Responsibility Accounting 390
16.1.1 Performance Evaluation Vignettes 391
16.1.2 Controllability Principle 393
16.2 A Closer Look at Controllability 393
16.3 Interpretation of Performance Evaluation Vignettes 398
16.3.1 Service Department Manager 398
16.3.2 Sales Contest 399
16.3.3 Profit Center 400
16.3.4 Overtime on Rush Orders 401
16.3.5 Sales Markdowns 401
16.3.6 Fast Food Manager 402
16.4 A Caveat 402
16.5 The Language of Expectations 404
16.6 Summary 406
16.7 Bibliographic Notes 406
16.8 Problems and Exercises 407
17 Communication 415
17.1 Self-Reporting Incentives in the Managerial Input Model 416
17.1.1 Expanded Options 418
17.1.2 Incentive Compatible Resolution 419
17.2 Variations on a Theme 423
17.2.1 Late Arrival of Private Information 423
17.2.2 Two-Sided Opportunistic Behavior 424
17.2.3 Early Arrival 425
17.2.4 Counterproductive Information 426
17.3 Intertemporal Considerations 427
17.4 The Larger Picture 429
17.5 Summary 430
17.6 Bibliographic Notes 430
17.7 Problems and Exercises 431
18 Coordination 437
18.1 Master Budgets 438
18.1.1 Aggregation into a Global View 438
18.1.2 Disaggregation into a Sea of Coordinated Details 438
18.1.3 Authorization and Communication 439
18.1.4 Ties to Responsibility Accounting 440
18.2 Short-Run versus Long-Run Coordination 440
18.2.1 Task Balance, Again 441
18.2.2 Additional Frictions 445
18.2.3 Balancing Devices 446
18.3 Inter-Manager Coordination 447
18.3.1 Inter-Division Trade in the Face of Control Frictions 448
18.3.2 Regulation of Inter-Division Trade 449
18.3.3 Variations on a Theme 452
18.4 Coordinated Sabotage 453
18.5 Summary 456
18.6 Bibliographic Notes 456
18.7 Problems and Exercises 457
19 End Game 463
19.1 Concurrency 463
19.2 Governance 465
19.2.1 Incomplete Contracts 465
19.2.2 Accounting Governance 468
19.2.3 Governance Failures 469
19.3 Responsibility 469
19.4 Summary 470
19.5 Bibliographic Notes 470
19.6 Problems and Exercises 470
References 473
Index 487
Preface xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Accounting Resources 2
1.2 Modes of Study 4
1.3 Ingredients for an Interesting Stew 6
1.4 Overview 8
1.5 Summary 10
1.6 Bibliographic Notes 10
2 Economic Foundations: The Single Product Firm 11
2.1 Perfect Markets 12
2.2 The Firm Straddles Markets 12
2.3 The Economic Cost Function 15
2.3.1 Cost Function Terminology 16
2.3.2 A Closer Look at the Cost Function 18
2.4 Shadow Prices 21
2.5 Cost and Revenue Framing 23
2.6 Short-Run versus Long-Run Cost 24
2.7 Summary 27
2.8 Appendix: Constrained Optimization and Shadow Prices 29
2.9 Bibliographic Notes 31
2.10 Problems and Exercises 31
3 Economic Foundations: The Multiproduct Firm 35
3.1 Back to Perfect Markets 36
3.1.1 What is a Good or Service 36
3.1.2 Present Value 36
3.2 The Multiproduct Firm 38
3.3 The Multiproduct Cost Function 39
3.3.1 Cost Function Terminology 40
3.3.2 Cost Function Separability 41
3.3.3 Ubiquity of Marginal Cost 46
3.4 A Multiperiod Interpretation 48
3.4.1 Present Value to the Rescue 49
3.4.2 The Multiperiod Cost Function 50
3.5 Summary 52
3.6 Bibliographic Notes 52
3.7 Problems and Exercises 53
4 Accounting versus Economics 59
4.1 Back to the Multiproduct, Single Period Firm 60
4.1.1 The Economic Story 61
4.1.2 The Accounting Story 61
4.1.3 Per Unit Product Costs 65
4.2 The Underlying Recipe 67
4.3 The Multiperiod Case 69
4.3.1 The Economic Story 69
4.3.2 The Accounting Story 74
4.4 Accounting Conventions 75
4.5 Summary 77
4.6 Bibliographic Notes 78
4.7 Problems and Exercises 78
5 A Closer Look at the Accountant's Art 83
5.1 An Extended Illustration 84
5.1.1 One Among Many Answers 86
5.1.2 Central Features of the Construction 89
5.2 Unit Costing Art 92
5.2.1 Aggregation 93
5.2.2 Linear Approximation 93
5.2.3 Cost Allocation 97
5.3 The Constructive Procedure 99
5.4 Short-Run versus Long-Run Marginal Cost 100
5.5 Summary 103
5.6 Bibliographic Notes 104
5.7 Problems and Exercises 104
6 The Impressionism School 111
6.1 More Terminology 112
6.2 Data for an Extended Illustration 113
6.3 Assignment of Actual Overhead Totals 114
6.4 Assignment of Estimated Overhead Totals 116
6.4.1 Normal, Full Costing 116
6.4.2 Normal, Variable Cost 121
6.4.3 Remarks 124
6.5 Standard Cost Systems 125
6.6 Summary 127
6.7 Bibliographic Notes 128
6.8 Problems and Exercises 128
7 The Modernism School 137
7.1 Variations on a Theme 138
7.2 The Underlying Structure 143
7.3 Back to the Firm's Technology 144
7.3.1 Marginal Costs 146
7.3.2 Impressionism's Answer 146
7.3.3 ABC's Answer 147
7.3.4 Back to Marginal Costs 150
7.4 Numerical Explorations 152
7.4.1 Decreasing Returns 152
7.4.2 Increasing Returns 153
7.4.3 Mixed Case 156
7.5 Portfolio of Errors 156
7.6 Summary 161
7.7 Bibliographic Notes 162
7.8 Problems and Exercises 163
8 Consistent Decision Framing 167
8.1 Economic Rationality 168
8.1.1 Consistency 170
8.1.2 Smoothness 171
8.1.3 Consistent Framing 172
8.2 Irrelevance of Increasing Transformations 173
8.3 Local Searches are Possible 176
8.3.1 The Economist's Approach 179
8.3.2 Shadow Prices 180
8.4 Component Searches are Possible 182
8.4.1 Cost Functions 183
8.4.2 The General Idea 183
8.4.3 Interactions 184
8.5 Consistent Framing 187
8.6 Summary 187
8.7 Bibliographic Notes 188
8.8 Problems and Exercises 188
9 Consistent Framing under Uncertainty 195
9.1 Explicit Uncertainty 196
9.1.1 Choices as Lotteries 196
9.1.2 Choices as State Dependent Outcomes 197
9.2 Consistent Choice with Probabilities 198
9.2.1 Scaling 200
9.2.2 Consistency, Smoothness and Independence 201
9.3 Certainty Equivalents 201
9.3.1 A Convenient Transformation 202
9.3.2 A Special Case 203
9.4 Risk Aversion 204
9.5 Information 207
9.6 An Important Aside 211
9.7 Summary 212
9.8 Bibliographic Notes 213
9.9 Problems and Exercises 213
10 Consistent Framing in a Strategic Setting 221
10.1 Equilibrium Behavior 222
10.1.1 Simultaneous Choice 223
10.1.2 Sequential Choice 224
10.1.3 Repeated Choice 225
10.2 Sharing a Market 226
10.3 Racing to Capture a Market 228
10.4 Bidding for a Prize 229
10.4.1 Uninformed Bidders 230
10.4.2 Equilibrium Bidding with Private Information 231
10.4.3 Winner's Curse 234
10.5 Haggling 239
10.5.1 Milquetoast Players 239
10.5.2 Private Cost Information 240
10.6 Internal Control 242
10.6.1 Decision Rights 243
10.6.2 Redundancy 244
10.6.3 Explicit Incentives 244
10.6.4 Equilibrium Behavior 245
10.7 Summary 245
10.8 Bibliographic Notes 246
10.9 Problems and Exercises 247
11 Large versus Small Decisions: Short-Run 253
11.1 Preliminaries 254
11.1.1 Break-Even Analysis 254
11.1.2 Framing Subtleties 257
11.2 Make or Buy 262
11.2.1 A Two Product Illustration 262
11.2.2 An Unusual Offer 264
11.3 Product Evaluation 267
11.4 Customer Evaluation 269
11.5 Uncertainty 270
11.5.1 Option Value of Flexibility 270
11.5.2 Cost of Risk 271
11.6 Interaction with Taxes 274
11.7 Summary 275
11.8 Bibliographic Notes 276
11.9 Problems and Exercises 276
12 Large versus Small Decisions: Long-Run 287
12.1 Back to Present Value 288
12.2 Present Value Pretenders 292
12.2.1 Internal Rate of Return 292
12.2.2 Payback 295
12.2.3 Framing 296
12.3 Cash Flow Estimation 297
12.3.1 An Earlier Story 298
12.3.2 The Proposed Project 299
12.3.3 Is this a Large Decision? 299
12.4 Rendering in the Accounting Library 303
12.4.1 Accounting Rate of Return 305
12.4.2 Closing the Gap 305
12.5 Summary 308
12.6 Bibliographic Notes 309
12.7 Problems and Exercises 309
13 Economic Foundations: Performance Evaluation 315
13.1 Performance Evaluation 315
13.2 A Streamlined Production Setting 318
13.2.1 Managerial Service 318
13.2.2 Preferences of the Supplier 319
13.3 Transacting with a Perfect Labor Market 321
13.4 Transacting in the Face of Market Frictions 322
13.4.1 Self-Interested Behavior 322
13.4.2 Public Observation of Input 324
13.4.3 Limited Public Information 325
13.5 The Bad News 331
13.5.1 Trivial Managerial Risk Aversion 331
13.5.2 Trivial Odds of Low Output under Input H 332
13.5.3 Trivial Incremental Personal Cost 333
13.5.4 The Unavoidable Conclusion 334
13.6 A More Expansive View 335
13.7 Summary 336
13.8 Bibliographic Notes 337
13.9 Problems and Exercises 338
14 Economic Foundations: Informative Performance Evaluation 343
14.1 Slightly Expanded Setting 343
14.2 A Convenient Transformation 345
14.3 Informativeness 347
14.3.1 How the Model Uses the Information 350
14.3.2 The Informativeness Criterion 353
14.4 Larger Picture 356
14.5 Summary 357
14.6 Bibliographic Notes 358
14.7 Problems and Exercises 358
15 Allocation Among Tasks 363
15.1 Allocation of Total Input 364
15.1.1 An Extreme Case 366
15.1.2 More Information 368
15.2 Balanced Attention to the Two Tasks 371
15.2.1 Expanded Control Problem 371
15.2.2 More Information (again) 372
15.3 Insight into the Performance Evaluation Game 375
15.3.1 Good Information Drives out Bad Information 375
15.3.2 Bad Information Drives out Good Information 377
15.3.3 Task Assignment Matters 378
15.3.4 Intertemporal Balance 379
15.4 Stepping Back 379
15.5 Summary 381
15.6 Bibliographic Notes 381
15.7 Problems and Exercises 381
16 Accounting-Based Performance Evaluation 389
16.1 Responsibility Accounting 390
16.1.1 Performance Evaluation Vignettes 391
16.1.2 Controllability Principle 393
16.2 A Closer Look at Controllability 393
16.3 Interpretation of Performance Evaluation Vignettes 398
16.3.1 Service Department Manager 398
16.3.2 Sales Contest 399
16.3.3 Profit Center 400
16.3.4 Overtime on Rush Orders 401
16.3.5 Sales Markdowns 401
16.3.6 Fast Food Manager 402
16.4 A Caveat 402
16.5 The Language of Expectations 404
16.6 Summary 406
16.7 Bibliographic Notes 406
16.8 Problems and Exercises 407
17 Communication 415
17.1 Self-Reporting Incentives in the Managerial Input Model 416
17.1.1 Expanded Options 418
17.1.2 Incentive Compatible Resolution 419
17.2 Variations on a Theme 423
17.2.1 Late Arrival of Private Information 423
17.2.2 Two-Sided Opportunistic Behavior 424
17.2.3 Early Arrival 425
17.2.4 Counterproductive Information 426
17.3 Intertemporal Considerations 427
17.4 The Larger Picture 429
17.5 Summary 430
17.6 Bibliographic Notes 430
17.7 Problems and Exercises 431
18 Coordination 437
18.1 Master Budgets 438
18.1.1 Aggregation into a Global View 438
18.1.2 Disaggregation into a Sea of Coordinated Details 438
18.1.3 Authorization and Communication 439
18.1.4 Ties to Responsibility Accounting 440
18.2 Short-Run versus Long-Run Coordination 440
18.2.1 Task Balance, Again 441
18.2.2 Additional Frictions 445
18.2.3 Balancing Devices 446
18.3 Inter-Manager Coordination 447
18.3.1 Inter-Division Trade in the Face of Control Frictions 448
18.3.2 Regulation of Inter-Division Trade 449
18.3.3 Variations on a Theme 452
18.4 Coordinated Sabotage 453
18.5 Summary 456
18.6 Bibliographic Notes 456
18.7 Problems and Exercises 457
19 End Game 463
19.1 Concurrency 463
19.2 Governance 465
19.2.1 Incomplete Contracts 465
19.2.2 Accounting Governance 468
19.2.3 Governance Failures 469
19.3 Responsibility 469
19.4 Summary 470
19.5 Bibliographic Notes 470
19.6 Problems and Exercises 470
References 473
Index 487
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