Table Of Contents:
Series Foreword xi(2)
Preface xiii

1 Introduction 1(36)

1.1 Game Theory 1(4)

1.2 Equilibrium 5(7)

1.3 Evolutionary Games 12(5)

1.4 Evolution 17(6)

1.5 Evolution and Equilibrium 21(13)

1.6 The Path Ahead 34(3)

2 The Evolution of Models 37(46)

2.1 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 38(12)

2.2 Alternative Notions of Evolutionary Stability 50(12)

2.3 Dynamic Systems 62(21)

3 A Model of Evolution 83(30)

3.1 The Aspiration and Imitation Model 84(4)

3.2 Time 88(7)

3.3 Sample Paths 95(5)

3.4 Stationary Distributions 100(3)

3.5 Limits 103(5)

3.6 Appendix: Proofs 108(5)

4 The Dynamics of Sample Paths 113(26)

4.1 Dynamics 113(5)

4.2 Equilibrium 118(3)

4.3 Strictly Dominated Strategies 121(2)

4.4 Weakly Dominated Strategies 123(9)

4.5 Appendix: Proofs 132(7)

5 The Ultimatum Game 139(30)

5.1 The Ultimatum Game 140(2)

5.2 An Ultimatum Minigame 142(7)

5.3 Numerical Calculations 149(9)

5.4 Relevance to Experimental Data? 158(4)

5.5 Leaving Money on the Table 162(5)

5.6 Appendix: Proofs 167(2)

6 Drift 169(36)

6.1 Introduction 169(1)

6.2 The Model 170(10)

6.3 When Can Drift Be Ignored? 180(7)

6.4 When Drift Matters 187(5)

6.5 Examples 192(11)

6.6 Discussion 203(2)

7 Noise 205(34)

7.1 The Model 207(3)

7.2 Limit Distributions 210(12)

7.3 Alternative best Replies 222(8)

7.4 Trembles 230(4)

7.5 Appendix: Proofs 234(5)

8 Backward and Forward Induction 239(28)

8.1 Introduction 239(2)

8.2 The Model 241(5)

8.3 Recurrent Outcomes 246(4)

8.4 Backward Induction 250(5)

8.5 Forward Induction 255(4)

8.6 Markets 259(2)

8.7 Appendix: Proofs 261(6)

9 Strict Nash Equilibria 267(24)

9.1 A Muddling Model 269(4)

9.2 Dynamics 273(5)

9.3 Equilibrium Selection 278(7)

9.4 Risk Dominance 285(2)

9.5 Discussion 287(4)

10 Conclusion 291(2)
References 293(14)
Index 307