简介
Summary:
Publisher Summary 1
More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, while offering insights into the theoretical ideas and stratagems not available elsewhere. Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.The book's clear and logical organization begins with an introduction that summarizes regulatory practices, recounts the history of thought that led to the emergence of the new regulatory economics, sets up the basic structure of the model, and previews the economic questions tackled in the next seventeen chapters. The structure of the model developed in the introductory chapter remains the same throughout subsequent chapters, ensuring both stability and consistency. The concluding chapter discusses important areas for future work in regulatory economics.Each chapter opens with a discussion of the economic issues, an informal description of the applicable model, and an overview of the results and intuition. It then develops the formal analysis, including sufficient explanations for those with little training in information economics or game theory. Bibliographic notes provide a historical perspective of developments in the area and a description of complementary research. Detailed proofs are given of all major conclusions, making the book valuable as a source of modern research techniques. There is a large set of review problems at the end of the book.Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics at Universit茅 des Sciences Sociales in Toulouse where Jean Tirole is Scientific Director at the Institut d'Economi茅 Industrielle.
Publisher Summary 2
Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.
目录
Table Of Contents:
Foreword xvii
Acknowledgments xxiii
Introduction 1(1)
The Regulatory Environment and Institutions 1(9)
Regulatory Constraints 1(5)
Regulatory Instruments and Incentive Schemes 6(2)
Simple versus Informationally Demanding Regulatory Rule 8(1)
Procurement versus Regulation 8(2)
Commonly Used Incentive Schemes 10(9)
Procurement Contracts 12(1)
Regulatory Incentive Schemes in the Absence of Government Transfers 13(6)
Received Theory and the Agenda for the New Regulatory Economics 19(16)
Marginal Cost Pricing 19(1)
Peak-Load Pricing 20(3)
Marginal or Average Cost Pricing? 23(7)
Balanced Budget and the Ramsey-Boiteux Model of Cost-of-Service Regulation 30(3)
Input Choices 33(1)
The Agenda of the New Regulatory Economics 34(1)
Methodology and Overview of the Book 35(18)
The Controlled Experiment 35(4)
Overview of the Book 39(8)
References 47(6)
I PRICE AND RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION
Cost-Reimbursement Rules 53(76)
Some Background 53(2)
The Model 55(2)
The Two-Type Case 57(6)
Continuum of Types 63(13)
Decentralization through a Menu of Linear Contracts 69(2)
Parameters of the Incentive Scheme and Performance 71(1)
Additive Noise and Linear Contracts 72(1)
The Two-Type Case and Nonlinearity of Optimal Contracts 73(1)
Shutdown of the Firm 73(2)
Compensation Caps and Cost Ceilings 75(1)
The Main Economic Conclusions 76(6)
Implementation: Relevance and Informational Requirements of Menus 82(2)
Using Yardstick ``Competition'' to Reduce Informational Asymmetries 84(2)
Adding Investment to the Model 86(13)
Contractible Investment 88(3)
Noncontractible Investment 91(2)
Private Information on the Desirability of Investment: Rate of Return on Investment, Incentives, and the Averch-Johnson Model 93(6)
Investment under Noncommitment 99(4)
Rent Extraction Generating Underinvestment 100(1)
Four Mechanisms Mitigating the Underinvestment Effect 101(2)
Multiperiod Relationship under Commitment: False Dynamics 103(2)
Risk Aversion 105(24)
Bibliographic Notes 106(13)
Appendixes 119(5)
References 124(5)
Pricing by a Single-Product Firm with and Without Budget Balance 129(36)
Some Background 129(2)
The Model 131(3)
Description 131(2)
Full Information 133(1)
The Two-Type Case 134(3)
Continuum of Types 137(2)
Delegation of Pricing to the Firm 139(6)
An Introduction to Price Taxes 139(3)
Using Historical Data to Construct the Price Tax 142(3)
Two-Part Tariffs in the Absence of Government Transfer 145(6)
The Optimal Two-Part Tariff 147(2)
Optimal Cost-of-Service Regulation 149(2)
Linear Pricing in the Absence of Government Transfer 151(4)
Optimal Linear Prices as Sliding Scale Plans 151(3)
Relationship to Monopoly Pricing and Price Caps 154(1)
Concluding Remarks 155(10)
Bibliographic Notes 155(9)
References 164(1)
Pricing and Incentives in a Multiproduct Firm 165(46)
Some Background 165(2)
Optimal Regulation 167(5)
The Model 168(1)
The Optimal Regulatory Allocation 169(2)
Linearity of Cost-Reimbursement Rules 171(1)
Third-Degree Price Discrimination 172(3)
Ramsey Pricing 172(1)
Peak-Load Pricing 173(2)
Second-Degree Price Discrimination 175(2)
Fully Nonlinear Pricing 175(1)
Two-Part Tariffs 176(1)
Verifiable Quality 177(1)
A Procurement Example 177(1)
A Regulation Example 177(1)
The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy 178(3)
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 178(2)
Example of Nondichotomy 180(1)
The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy in the Absence of Government Transfer 180(1)
Multidimensional Effort and Characteristics 181(6)
Effort Allocation: The Shared-Fixed-Cost Model 181(3)
Multidimensional Type 184(2)
Effort Allocation: The Shared-Marginal-Cost Model 186(1)
Is Subcost Observation Useful? 187(7)
One-Dimensional Type 189(2)
Multidimensional Type 191(3)
General Equilibrium Analysis: Foundations of the Shadow Cost of Public Funds and Taxation by Regulation 194(6)
Motivation 194(2)
An Imperfect Income Taxation Model 196(4)
Concluding Remarks 200(11)
Bibliographic Notes 202(4)
Appendixes 206(2)
References 208(3)
Regulation of Quality 211(36)
Some Background 211(3)
The Model with a Search Good 214(5)
Incentives to Provide Quality 215(2)
Incentives for Quality and Cost Reduction 217(2)
Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information 219(4)
Implementation of the Optimal Regulatory Mechanism 223(2)
Concern for Quality and the Power of Incentive Schemes 225(2)
Reputation Incentives for an Experience Good 227(4)
Concluding Remarks 231(16)
Bibliographic Notes 233(1)
Appendixes 234(9)
References 243(4)
II PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION
Competitive Ramsey Formulas and Access Pricing 247(26)
Some Background 247(2)
Pricing and Competition 249(6)
Regulated Competition 250(1)
Unregulated Competitive Fringe 251(2)
Unregulated Competition with Distorted Pricing 253(2)
Access Pricing: Pricing in the Absence of Incentive Correction 255(3)
Access Pricing and Incentives 258(8)
Common Network 259(4)
Network Expansion 263(3)
Concluding Remarks 266(7)
Bibliographic Notes 267(1)
Appendixes 268(3)
References 271(2)
Bypass and Cream Skimming 273(34)
Some Background 273(2)
The Model 275(1)
Optimal Pricing Rules and Optimal Incentive Schemes 276(9)
Bypass and Cream Skimming 285(5)
Some Further Considerations about Bypass: Redistribution and Budget Constraint 290(5)
Concluding Remarks 295(12)
Bibliographic Notes 296(2)
Appendixes 298(5)
References 303(4)
III BIDDING FOR NATURAL MONOPOLY
Auctioning Incentive Contracts 307(34)
Some Background 307(2)
The Model 309(1)
The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Two-Firm, Two-Type Case 310(4)
The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Continuum Case 314(5)
The Firm's Bidding Behavior 314(1)
The Optimal Auction 315(4)
Implementation by a Dominant Strategy Auction 319(3)
Reduction in Transfer 320(1)
Equivalent Dominant Strategy Auction 320(1)
On the Revelation Principle in an Auction 321(1)
Optimality of Linear Contracts 322(1)
Auctions in Regulation 322(2)
Concluding Remarks 324(17)
Bibliographic Notes 325(12)
Appendixes 337(2)
References 339(2)
Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity 341(34)
Some Background 341(2)
The Model 343(3)
Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information 346(6)
Learning by Doing 352(3)
Assessment of the Model 355(1)
Transferable Investment 356(3)
Concluding Remarks 359(16)
Bibliographic Notes 360(5)
Appendixes 365(5)
References 370(5)
IV THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATION
Dynamics Without Commitment and the Ratchet Effect 375(62)
Some Background 375(4)
The Model 379(2)
Ratcheting and Pooling in the Continuum Case 381(6)
The Two-Type Case 387(14)
Characterization of Finite First-Period Menus That Induce the Upper Bound on Welfare 388(2)
Preliminary Analysis: Two-Contract Menus 390(7)
Comparative Statics of the Optimal Contract in an Example 397(1)
General Results 397(4)
Concluding Remarks 401(36)
Bibliographic Notes 401(14)
Appendixes 415(20)
References 435(2)
Commitment and Renegotiation 437(38)
Some Background 437(3)
The Model 440(3)
The Commitment Framework 440(3)
The Renegotiation Game 443(1)
Renegotiation-Proof Second-Period Contracts 443(4)
Characterization of the Optimal Contract 447(4)
How Much Pooling? 451(5)
Continuum of Types 456(2)
Commitment, Renegotiation, and Noncommitment 458(17)
Bibliographic Notes 460(4)
Appendixes 464(7)
References 471(4)
V THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
Regulatory Capture 475(40)
Some Background 475(5)
The Model 480(2)
The Firm 480(1)
The Agency 480(1)
Congress 481(1)
Consumer Groups 482(1)
Collusion-Free Regulation 482(3)
Full Information 483(1)
Asymmetric Information 484(1)
Producer Protection 485(3)
Multiple Interest Groups 488(5)
Shutdown of the Regulated Firm 493(1)
A Political Theory of Cross-subsidization 494(4)
Concluding Remarks 498(17)
Bibliographic Notes 500(6)
Appendixes 506(6)
References 512(3)
Cost Padding, Auditing, and Collusion 515(22)
Some Background 515(2)
The Benchmark (No Cost Padding, No Auditing) 517(2)
Audit of Cost Padding 519(8)
Benevolent Audit of Cost Padding 519(5)
Collusion in Auditing 524(3)
Monitoring of Effort 527(10)
Benevolent Monitoring of Effort 528(1)
Collusion in Monitoring of Effort 529(2)
Bibliographic Notes 531(1)
Appendix 532(2)
References 534(3)
Cartelization by Regulation 537(22)
Some Background 537(3)
The Model 540(4)
Benevolent Agency and Incomplete Information about the Incumbent's Technology 544(2)
Cartelization 546(4)
Pro- and Anticompetition Agencies 550(9)
Summary of the Argument 550(1)
Agency-Entrant and Agency-Customer Collusion and Entry 551(1)
Appendixes 552(5)
References 557(2)
Auction Design and Favoritism 559(32)
Some Background 559(4)
The Model 563(2)
Optimal Auction with a Benevolent Agency 565(3)
Collusion and Soft Information 568(4)
Description of Collusion 568(1)
Soft Information 569(2)
Indirect Bid Rigging 571(1)
Asymmetric Collusion and Hard Information 572(1)
Symmetric Collusion and Hard Information 573(5)
Concluding Remarks 578(13)
Appendixes 581(6)
References 587(4)
VI REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS
Regulatory Instruments, Hearings, and Interest Group Monitoring 591(28)
Welfare Foundations of Institutions 591(4)
The Model 595(7)
Components 595(4)
Benevolent Agency Benchmark 599(1)
Collusive Agency 600(2)
The Solution 602(8)
Average Cost Pricing 602(2)
Marginal Cost Pricing 604(1)
Optimal Institutions 604(4)
Subsidies for Intervener Programs 608(1)
Alternative Technologies 609(1)
Standards of Judicial Review 610(1)
Choice of Watchdog 610(2)
Concluding Remarks 612(7)
Appendixes 613(3)
References 616(3)
Commitment and Political Accountability 619(18)
Some Background 619(2)
Short-lived Regulators and the Optimal Constitution 621(6)
The Model 621(3)
Commitment 624(1)
Noncommitment 625(1)
Optimal Constitution 626(1)
Short-lived Regulators and Complete Contracting 627(3)
Investment Induced 628(1)
No Investment 628(2)
Elections, Career Concerns, and Commitment 630(5)
Commitment Constitution 631(1)
Noncommitment Constitution 632(1)
Flexibility-on-Commitment Constitution 633(1)
Campaign Contributions 634(1)
Concluding Remarks 635(2)
Bibliographic Notes 636(1)
References 636(1)
Privatization and Incentives 637(24)
Some Background 637(8)
Public Enterprise, Private Regulated Firm, and Unregulated Firm 638(1)
Conventional Wisdom about Privatizations 639(3)
Residual Rights Considerations 642(3)
The Model 645(2)
Public Ownership 645(1)
The Regulated Private Firm 646(1)
Optimal Regulation with Public Ownership 647(2)
Optimal Regulation of a Private Firm 649(4)
Differentiable Equilibrium 649(3)
Nondifferentiable Equilibria 652(1)
Comparison of Ownership Structures 653(1)
Concluding Remarks 654(7)
Bibliographic Notes 655(2)
Appendixes 657(1)
References 658(3)
Conclusion 661(10)
Review Exercises 671(24)
Index 695
Foreword xvii
Acknowledgments xxiii
Introduction 1(1)
The Regulatory Environment and Institutions 1(9)
Regulatory Constraints 1(5)
Regulatory Instruments and Incentive Schemes 6(2)
Simple versus Informationally Demanding Regulatory Rule 8(1)
Procurement versus Regulation 8(2)
Commonly Used Incentive Schemes 10(9)
Procurement Contracts 12(1)
Regulatory Incentive Schemes in the Absence of Government Transfers 13(6)
Received Theory and the Agenda for the New Regulatory Economics 19(16)
Marginal Cost Pricing 19(1)
Peak-Load Pricing 20(3)
Marginal or Average Cost Pricing? 23(7)
Balanced Budget and the Ramsey-Boiteux Model of Cost-of-Service Regulation 30(3)
Input Choices 33(1)
The Agenda of the New Regulatory Economics 34(1)
Methodology and Overview of the Book 35(18)
The Controlled Experiment 35(4)
Overview of the Book 39(8)
References 47(6)
I PRICE AND RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION
Cost-Reimbursement Rules 53(76)
Some Background 53(2)
The Model 55(2)
The Two-Type Case 57(6)
Continuum of Types 63(13)
Decentralization through a Menu of Linear Contracts 69(2)
Parameters of the Incentive Scheme and Performance 71(1)
Additive Noise and Linear Contracts 72(1)
The Two-Type Case and Nonlinearity of Optimal Contracts 73(1)
Shutdown of the Firm 73(2)
Compensation Caps and Cost Ceilings 75(1)
The Main Economic Conclusions 76(6)
Implementation: Relevance and Informational Requirements of Menus 82(2)
Using Yardstick ``Competition'' to Reduce Informational Asymmetries 84(2)
Adding Investment to the Model 86(13)
Contractible Investment 88(3)
Noncontractible Investment 91(2)
Private Information on the Desirability of Investment: Rate of Return on Investment, Incentives, and the Averch-Johnson Model 93(6)
Investment under Noncommitment 99(4)
Rent Extraction Generating Underinvestment 100(1)
Four Mechanisms Mitigating the Underinvestment Effect 101(2)
Multiperiod Relationship under Commitment: False Dynamics 103(2)
Risk Aversion 105(24)
Bibliographic Notes 106(13)
Appendixes 119(5)
References 124(5)
Pricing by a Single-Product Firm with and Without Budget Balance 129(36)
Some Background 129(2)
The Model 131(3)
Description 131(2)
Full Information 133(1)
The Two-Type Case 134(3)
Continuum of Types 137(2)
Delegation of Pricing to the Firm 139(6)
An Introduction to Price Taxes 139(3)
Using Historical Data to Construct the Price Tax 142(3)
Two-Part Tariffs in the Absence of Government Transfer 145(6)
The Optimal Two-Part Tariff 147(2)
Optimal Cost-of-Service Regulation 149(2)
Linear Pricing in the Absence of Government Transfer 151(4)
Optimal Linear Prices as Sliding Scale Plans 151(3)
Relationship to Monopoly Pricing and Price Caps 154(1)
Concluding Remarks 155(10)
Bibliographic Notes 155(9)
References 164(1)
Pricing and Incentives in a Multiproduct Firm 165(46)
Some Background 165(2)
Optimal Regulation 167(5)
The Model 168(1)
The Optimal Regulatory Allocation 169(2)
Linearity of Cost-Reimbursement Rules 171(1)
Third-Degree Price Discrimination 172(3)
Ramsey Pricing 172(1)
Peak-Load Pricing 173(2)
Second-Degree Price Discrimination 175(2)
Fully Nonlinear Pricing 175(1)
Two-Part Tariffs 176(1)
Verifiable Quality 177(1)
A Procurement Example 177(1)
A Regulation Example 177(1)
The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy 178(3)
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 178(2)
Example of Nondichotomy 180(1)
The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy in the Absence of Government Transfer 180(1)
Multidimensional Effort and Characteristics 181(6)
Effort Allocation: The Shared-Fixed-Cost Model 181(3)
Multidimensional Type 184(2)
Effort Allocation: The Shared-Marginal-Cost Model 186(1)
Is Subcost Observation Useful? 187(7)
One-Dimensional Type 189(2)
Multidimensional Type 191(3)
General Equilibrium Analysis: Foundations of the Shadow Cost of Public Funds and Taxation by Regulation 194(6)
Motivation 194(2)
An Imperfect Income Taxation Model 196(4)
Concluding Remarks 200(11)
Bibliographic Notes 202(4)
Appendixes 206(2)
References 208(3)
Regulation of Quality 211(36)
Some Background 211(3)
The Model with a Search Good 214(5)
Incentives to Provide Quality 215(2)
Incentives for Quality and Cost Reduction 217(2)
Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information 219(4)
Implementation of the Optimal Regulatory Mechanism 223(2)
Concern for Quality and the Power of Incentive Schemes 225(2)
Reputation Incentives for an Experience Good 227(4)
Concluding Remarks 231(16)
Bibliographic Notes 233(1)
Appendixes 234(9)
References 243(4)
II PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION
Competitive Ramsey Formulas and Access Pricing 247(26)
Some Background 247(2)
Pricing and Competition 249(6)
Regulated Competition 250(1)
Unregulated Competitive Fringe 251(2)
Unregulated Competition with Distorted Pricing 253(2)
Access Pricing: Pricing in the Absence of Incentive Correction 255(3)
Access Pricing and Incentives 258(8)
Common Network 259(4)
Network Expansion 263(3)
Concluding Remarks 266(7)
Bibliographic Notes 267(1)
Appendixes 268(3)
References 271(2)
Bypass and Cream Skimming 273(34)
Some Background 273(2)
The Model 275(1)
Optimal Pricing Rules and Optimal Incentive Schemes 276(9)
Bypass and Cream Skimming 285(5)
Some Further Considerations about Bypass: Redistribution and Budget Constraint 290(5)
Concluding Remarks 295(12)
Bibliographic Notes 296(2)
Appendixes 298(5)
References 303(4)
III BIDDING FOR NATURAL MONOPOLY
Auctioning Incentive Contracts 307(34)
Some Background 307(2)
The Model 309(1)
The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Two-Firm, Two-Type Case 310(4)
The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Continuum Case 314(5)
The Firm's Bidding Behavior 314(1)
The Optimal Auction 315(4)
Implementation by a Dominant Strategy Auction 319(3)
Reduction in Transfer 320(1)
Equivalent Dominant Strategy Auction 320(1)
On the Revelation Principle in an Auction 321(1)
Optimality of Linear Contracts 322(1)
Auctions in Regulation 322(2)
Concluding Remarks 324(17)
Bibliographic Notes 325(12)
Appendixes 337(2)
References 339(2)
Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity 341(34)
Some Background 341(2)
The Model 343(3)
Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information 346(6)
Learning by Doing 352(3)
Assessment of the Model 355(1)
Transferable Investment 356(3)
Concluding Remarks 359(16)
Bibliographic Notes 360(5)
Appendixes 365(5)
References 370(5)
IV THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATION
Dynamics Without Commitment and the Ratchet Effect 375(62)
Some Background 375(4)
The Model 379(2)
Ratcheting and Pooling in the Continuum Case 381(6)
The Two-Type Case 387(14)
Characterization of Finite First-Period Menus That Induce the Upper Bound on Welfare 388(2)
Preliminary Analysis: Two-Contract Menus 390(7)
Comparative Statics of the Optimal Contract in an Example 397(1)
General Results 397(4)
Concluding Remarks 401(36)
Bibliographic Notes 401(14)
Appendixes 415(20)
References 435(2)
Commitment and Renegotiation 437(38)
Some Background 437(3)
The Model 440(3)
The Commitment Framework 440(3)
The Renegotiation Game 443(1)
Renegotiation-Proof Second-Period Contracts 443(4)
Characterization of the Optimal Contract 447(4)
How Much Pooling? 451(5)
Continuum of Types 456(2)
Commitment, Renegotiation, and Noncommitment 458(17)
Bibliographic Notes 460(4)
Appendixes 464(7)
References 471(4)
V THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
Regulatory Capture 475(40)
Some Background 475(5)
The Model 480(2)
The Firm 480(1)
The Agency 480(1)
Congress 481(1)
Consumer Groups 482(1)
Collusion-Free Regulation 482(3)
Full Information 483(1)
Asymmetric Information 484(1)
Producer Protection 485(3)
Multiple Interest Groups 488(5)
Shutdown of the Regulated Firm 493(1)
A Political Theory of Cross-subsidization 494(4)
Concluding Remarks 498(17)
Bibliographic Notes 500(6)
Appendixes 506(6)
References 512(3)
Cost Padding, Auditing, and Collusion 515(22)
Some Background 515(2)
The Benchmark (No Cost Padding, No Auditing) 517(2)
Audit of Cost Padding 519(8)
Benevolent Audit of Cost Padding 519(5)
Collusion in Auditing 524(3)
Monitoring of Effort 527(10)
Benevolent Monitoring of Effort 528(1)
Collusion in Monitoring of Effort 529(2)
Bibliographic Notes 531(1)
Appendix 532(2)
References 534(3)
Cartelization by Regulation 537(22)
Some Background 537(3)
The Model 540(4)
Benevolent Agency and Incomplete Information about the Incumbent's Technology 544(2)
Cartelization 546(4)
Pro- and Anticompetition Agencies 550(9)
Summary of the Argument 550(1)
Agency-Entrant and Agency-Customer Collusion and Entry 551(1)
Appendixes 552(5)
References 557(2)
Auction Design and Favoritism 559(32)
Some Background 559(4)
The Model 563(2)
Optimal Auction with a Benevolent Agency 565(3)
Collusion and Soft Information 568(4)
Description of Collusion 568(1)
Soft Information 569(2)
Indirect Bid Rigging 571(1)
Asymmetric Collusion and Hard Information 572(1)
Symmetric Collusion and Hard Information 573(5)
Concluding Remarks 578(13)
Appendixes 581(6)
References 587(4)
VI REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS
Regulatory Instruments, Hearings, and Interest Group Monitoring 591(28)
Welfare Foundations of Institutions 591(4)
The Model 595(7)
Components 595(4)
Benevolent Agency Benchmark 599(1)
Collusive Agency 600(2)
The Solution 602(8)
Average Cost Pricing 602(2)
Marginal Cost Pricing 604(1)
Optimal Institutions 604(4)
Subsidies for Intervener Programs 608(1)
Alternative Technologies 609(1)
Standards of Judicial Review 610(1)
Choice of Watchdog 610(2)
Concluding Remarks 612(7)
Appendixes 613(3)
References 616(3)
Commitment and Political Accountability 619(18)
Some Background 619(2)
Short-lived Regulators and the Optimal Constitution 621(6)
The Model 621(3)
Commitment 624(1)
Noncommitment 625(1)
Optimal Constitution 626(1)
Short-lived Regulators and Complete Contracting 627(3)
Investment Induced 628(1)
No Investment 628(2)
Elections, Career Concerns, and Commitment 630(5)
Commitment Constitution 631(1)
Noncommitment Constitution 632(1)
Flexibility-on-Commitment Constitution 633(1)
Campaign Contributions 634(1)
Concluding Remarks 635(2)
Bibliographic Notes 636(1)
References 636(1)
Privatization and Incentives 637(24)
Some Background 637(8)
Public Enterprise, Private Regulated Firm, and Unregulated Firm 638(1)
Conventional Wisdom about Privatizations 639(3)
Residual Rights Considerations 642(3)
The Model 645(2)
Public Ownership 645(1)
The Regulated Private Firm 646(1)
Optimal Regulation with Public Ownership 647(2)
Optimal Regulation of a Private Firm 649(4)
Differentiable Equilibrium 649(3)
Nondifferentiable Equilibria 652(1)
Comparison of Ownership Structures 653(1)
Concluding Remarks 654(7)
Bibliographic Notes 655(2)
Appendixes 657(1)
References 658(3)
Conclusion 661(10)
Review Exercises 671(24)
Index 695
- 名称
- 类型
- 大小
光盘服务联系方式: 020-38250260 客服QQ：4006604884
云图客服：
用户发送的提问，这种方式就需要有位在线客服来回答用户的问题，这种 就属于对话式的,问题是这种提问是否需要用户登录才能提问
Video Player
×
Audio Player
×
pdf Player
×
