The political economy of trade, aid and foreign investment policies /
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作 者：edited by Devashish Mitra, Arvind Panagariya.
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ISBN：9780444515971
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Summary:
Publisher Summary 1
While considerable progress has been made in analyzing the formulation of international economic policies, the existing literature remains deficient in several respects. First, the existing models take a relatively simplistic view of the political-economy environment. For example, in contrast to the observed reality, a large majority of the models view the government as a monolithic entity. Second, there is only limited recognition of the political-economy interactions between interest groups across national borders. Third, dynamic factors governing trade policy formulation have been essentially absent in the literature. Fourth, the empirical work in this area, both cross-industry within national boundaries and cross-national, is very much in infancy and in need of further development. Fifth, other aspects of international economic policy such as foreign aid and foreign direct investment have been scarcely addressed in the existing literature. In this volume, edited by Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, a group of distinguished scholars in international trade, especially from the younger generation, analyzes several of these important but neglected aspects of the political economy of international economic policy. The volume contains 12 essays topped by an introduction by the editors. The contributors to this volume are Alok Bohara, Carl Davidson, David Feldman, Kishore Gawande, Amy Glass, Omer Gokcekus, Keith Hall, William Kaempfer, Justin Knowles, Pravin Krishna, Phil Levy, Chris Magee, Steve Matusz, Wolfgang Mayer, John McLaren, Devashish Mitra, Alex Mourmouras, Doug Nelson, Arvind Panagariya, Martin Richardson, Martin Ross, Kamal Saggi and Ed Tower. The volume makes major advances in the area of political economy of trade, aid and investment policy, and therefore will be of considerable interest to academic researchers and students of international economics. Because of its obvious focus on the process of policy formulation, economists as think tanks, international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization, and trade-policy analysts in developed and developing countries will also read it.
目录
Table Of Contents:
Foreword vii
Preface ix
Contributors xi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1(10)
Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya
1.1 Part I 3(1)
1.2 Part II 4(2)
1.3 Part III 6(1)
1.4 Part IV 7(1)
References 8(3)
Part I. Making of Trade Policy: Theory
Chapter 2 Trade Policy Making by an Assembly 11(20)
John McLaren and Bilgehan Karabay
2.1 Introduction 11(3)
2.2 A specific-factors model 14(5)
2.2.1 Basic structure 14(1)
2.2.2 Voters' preferences and equilibrium 15(3)
2.2.3 Comparative statistics 18(1)
2.3 A Mayer- Heckscher- Ohlin Model 19(5)
2.4 The electoral college 24(2)
2.5 Conclusions and open questions 26(2)
Acknowledgements 28(1)
References 28(3)
Chapter 3 Should Policy Makers be Concerned About Adjustment Costs? 31(38)
Carl Davidson and Steven J. Matusz
3.1 Introduction 31(5)
3.2 The model 36(12)
3.2.1 Background 36(1)
3.2.2 Formalizing the model and finding the initial steady state 37(7)
3.2.3 Adjustment 44(3)
3.2.4 Strengths and weaknesses of our model 47(1)
3.3 Aggregate adjustment costs 48(5)
3.4 Adjustment costs and labor market flexibility 53(4)
3.5 Conclusion 57(2)
Acknowledgements 59(1)
Appendix A 60(3)
Appendix B 63(3)
Appendix C 66(1)
References 67(2)
Chapter 4 Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories 69(22)
Philip I. Levy
4.1 Introduction 70(2)
4.2 Developing testable implications of the theory 72(6)
4.3 Empirical evidence 78(8)
4.3.1 Existing tests 78(3)
4.3.2 Instrument choice as a test 81(3)
4.3.3 Evidence on non-tariff barriers 84(2)
4.4 Alternative explanations 86(2)
4.5 Conclusion 88(1)
Acknowledgements 88(1)
References 88(3)
Chapter 5 The Peculiar Political Economy of NAFTA: Complexity, Uncertainty and Footloose Policy Preferences 91(22)
H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelson
5.1 The fact: footloose aggregate preferences on NAFTA 93(6)
5.2 Policy complexity, social learning and footloose preferences 99(4)
5.3 An illustrative model 103(2)
5.4 Conclusion: on economists as participants in the politics of trade policy 105(2)
Acknowledgements 107(1)
References 107(6)
Part II. Making of Trade Policy: Empirical Analysis
Chapter 6 Interest and Ideology in the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act: A Bayesian Multivariate Probit Analysis 113(46)
Alok K. Bohara and Kishore Gawande
6.1 Introduction 114(2)
6.2 Background: the Trade Omnibus Act 116(3)
6.3 Analysis of the multivariate probit model 119(3)
6.4 Theory and measurement 122(4)
6.5 Data 126(4)
6.6 Empirical analysis 130(13)
6.6.1 Substantive issues of focus 130(1)
6.6.2 Analysis of MVP estimates from HOUSE voting 131(6)
6.6.3 Analysis of MVP estimates from SENATE voting 137(4)
6.6.4 Sensitivity analyses 141(2)
6.7 Model comparisons: Ideology versus interest 143(7)
6.8 Conclusion 150(1)
Acknowledgements 151(1)
Appendix A: Bayesian analysis of the multivariate probit model 151(4)
References 155(4)
Chapter 7 Industry and Factor Linkages Between Lobby Groups 159(18)
Christopher Magee
7.1 Introduction 159(3)
7.2 Theory 162(5)
7.3 Empirical analysis 167(7)
7.4 Conclusion 174(1)
References 175(2)
Chapter 8 Sweetening the Pot: How American Sugar Buys Protection 177(20)
Omer Gokcekus, Justin Knowles and Edward Tower
8.1 Introduction 178(1)
8.2 The US sugar program 179(1)
8.2.1 Price support loans 179(1)
8.2.2 Import restrictions 180(1)
8.3 Consequences of the program 180(2)
8.3.1 Increases users' costs 180(1)
8.3.2 Benefits for producers 181(1)
8.3.3 Net effect 182(1)
8.4 Sugar interest groups' contributions 182(2)
8.5 Determinants of sugar's campaign contributions 184(4)
8.6 Marginal effects of different attributes on the probability of getting money and the amount of money received by incumbent senators 188(4)
8.7 Concluding remarks 192(1)
Acknowledgements 193(1)
References 193(4)
Part III. Inter-Country Interactions
Chapter 9 Unilateralism in Trade Policy: A Survey of Alternative Political-Economy Approaches 197(16)
Pravin Krishna and Devashish Mitra
9.1 Introduction 198(2)
9.2 Models of reciprocated unilateralism 200(9)
9.2.1 A median-voter model 200(2)
9.2.2 A model with trade policy lobbying and endogenous lobby formation 202(6)
9.2.3 A model of leadership in trade policy negotiations 208(1)
9.3 Models of endogenous unilateralism 209(1)
9.3.1 Unilateral commitment to free trade as a means of preventing capital misallocation 209(1)
9.3.2 Unilateral commitment to free trade as a means of preventing wasteful political (organizational) activity 209(1)
9.4 Concluding remarks: the current state of the literature and issues for future research 210(2)
References 212(1)
Chapter 10 Trade Creation and Residual Quota Protection in a Free Trade Area with Domestic Monopoly 213(20)
David H. Feldman and Martin Richardson
10.1 Introduction 214(2)
10.2 Single domestic firm 216(4)
10.2.1 An FTA may not lead to any trade creation 217(2)
10.2.2 Welfare effects 219(1)
10.3 The political economy of FTA formation 220(9)
10.3.1 FTA is politically unattractive when profits and revenues are equally valued 222(3)
10.3.2 FTA can only be politically attractive if profits are more highly valued than revenues 225(4)
10.4 Conclusions 229(1)
Appendix A 230(1)
References 231(2)
Chapter 11 The Political Economy of Trade Sanctions Against South Africa: A Gravity Model Approach 233(16)
William H. Kaempfer and Martin Ross
11.1 Introduction: the law of demand for sanctions 234(1)
11.2 South African trade during the 1980's 235(3)
11.3 The gravity model of trade 238(3)
11.4 Empirical results 241(2)
11.5 Concluding remarks 243(1)
Acknowledgements 244(1)
References 244(5)
Part IV. Aid and Foreign Investment Policies
Chapter 12 The Political Economy of Unconditional and Conditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers 249(28)
Wolfgang Mayer and Alex Mourmouras
12.1 Introduction 250(4)
12.2 The common agency model 254(6)
12.2.1 Decision makers and their objectives 254(2)
12.2.2 Political equilibrium with unconditional assistance 256(1)
12.2.3 Political equilibrium with conditional assistance 257(3)
12.3 Instruments of assistance: loan rollovers vs. a final grant 260(2)
12.4 Unconditional assistance: the IFI should use a grant 262(4)
12.4.1 Unconditional loan decisions 263(1)
12.4.2 Unconditional grant decisions 264(2)
12.5 Conditional assistance: the IFI should use loans 266(5)
12.5.1 Conditional loan decisions 266(1)
12.5.2 Conditional grant decisions 267(4)
12.6 Concluding remarks 271(4)
Acknowledgements 275(1)
Appendix A. Derivation of Equation 18 275(1)
Appendix B. Derivation of Equation 19 275(1)
References 275(2)
Chapter 13 Crowding Out and Distributional Effects of FDI Policies 277(24)
Amy Jocelyn Glass and Kamal Saggi
13.1 Introduction 278(1)
13.2 Model 279(3)
13.3 No intervention and national treatment 282(3)
13.4 Discriminatory treatment 285(4)
13.4.1 Equilibrium 285(1)
13.4.2 Policy 286(2)
13.4.3 Discriminatory versus national treatment 288(1)
13.5 Most-favored-nation treatment 289(2)
13.5.1 Equilibrium 289(1)
13.5.2 Policy 289(1)
13.5.3 Discriminatory versus MFN treatment 290(1)
13.5.4 MFN versus national treatment 291(1)
13.6 Another basis for discrimination 291(1)
13.7 Conclusion 292(1)
Acknowledgements 293(1)
Appendix A 293(5)
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 293(1)
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 294(1)
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3 295(1)
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4 295(2)
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5 297(1)
A.6. Proof of Proposition 6 297(1)
References 298(3)
Index 301
Foreword vii
Preface ix
Contributors xi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1(10)
Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya
1.1 Part I 3(1)
1.2 Part II 4(2)
1.3 Part III 6(1)
1.4 Part IV 7(1)
References 8(3)
Part I. Making of Trade Policy: Theory
Chapter 2 Trade Policy Making by an Assembly 11(20)
John McLaren and Bilgehan Karabay
2.1 Introduction 11(3)
2.2 A specific-factors model 14(5)
2.2.1 Basic structure 14(1)
2.2.2 Voters' preferences and equilibrium 15(3)
2.2.3 Comparative statistics 18(1)
2.3 A Mayer- Heckscher- Ohlin Model 19(5)
2.4 The electoral college 24(2)
2.5 Conclusions and open questions 26(2)
Acknowledgements 28(1)
References 28(3)
Chapter 3 Should Policy Makers be Concerned About Adjustment Costs? 31(38)
Carl Davidson and Steven J. Matusz
3.1 Introduction 31(5)
3.2 The model 36(12)
3.2.1 Background 36(1)
3.2.2 Formalizing the model and finding the initial steady state 37(7)
3.2.3 Adjustment 44(3)
3.2.4 Strengths and weaknesses of our model 47(1)
3.3 Aggregate adjustment costs 48(5)
3.4 Adjustment costs and labor market flexibility 53(4)
3.5 Conclusion 57(2)
Acknowledgements 59(1)
Appendix A 60(3)
Appendix B 63(3)
Appendix C 66(1)
References 67(2)
Chapter 4 Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories 69(22)
Philip I. Levy
4.1 Introduction 70(2)
4.2 Developing testable implications of the theory 72(6)
4.3 Empirical evidence 78(8)
4.3.1 Existing tests 78(3)
4.3.2 Instrument choice as a test 81(3)
4.3.3 Evidence on non-tariff barriers 84(2)
4.4 Alternative explanations 86(2)
4.5 Conclusion 88(1)
Acknowledgements 88(1)
References 88(3)
Chapter 5 The Peculiar Political Economy of NAFTA: Complexity, Uncertainty and Footloose Policy Preferences 91(22)
H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelson
5.1 The fact: footloose aggregate preferences on NAFTA 93(6)
5.2 Policy complexity, social learning and footloose preferences 99(4)
5.3 An illustrative model 103(2)
5.4 Conclusion: on economists as participants in the politics of trade policy 105(2)
Acknowledgements 107(1)
References 107(6)
Part II. Making of Trade Policy: Empirical Analysis
Chapter 6 Interest and Ideology in the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act: A Bayesian Multivariate Probit Analysis 113(46)
Alok K. Bohara and Kishore Gawande
6.1 Introduction 114(2)
6.2 Background: the Trade Omnibus Act 116(3)
6.3 Analysis of the multivariate probit model 119(3)
6.4 Theory and measurement 122(4)
6.5 Data 126(4)
6.6 Empirical analysis 130(13)
6.6.1 Substantive issues of focus 130(1)
6.6.2 Analysis of MVP estimates from HOUSE voting 131(6)
6.6.3 Analysis of MVP estimates from SENATE voting 137(4)
6.6.4 Sensitivity analyses 141(2)
6.7 Model comparisons: Ideology versus interest 143(7)
6.8 Conclusion 150(1)
Acknowledgements 151(1)
Appendix A: Bayesian analysis of the multivariate probit model 151(4)
References 155(4)
Chapter 7 Industry and Factor Linkages Between Lobby Groups 159(18)
Christopher Magee
7.1 Introduction 159(3)
7.2 Theory 162(5)
7.3 Empirical analysis 167(7)
7.4 Conclusion 174(1)
References 175(2)
Chapter 8 Sweetening the Pot: How American Sugar Buys Protection 177(20)
Omer Gokcekus, Justin Knowles and Edward Tower
8.1 Introduction 178(1)
8.2 The US sugar program 179(1)
8.2.1 Price support loans 179(1)
8.2.2 Import restrictions 180(1)
8.3 Consequences of the program 180(2)
8.3.1 Increases users' costs 180(1)
8.3.2 Benefits for producers 181(1)
8.3.3 Net effect 182(1)
8.4 Sugar interest groups' contributions 182(2)
8.5 Determinants of sugar's campaign contributions 184(4)
8.6 Marginal effects of different attributes on the probability of getting money and the amount of money received by incumbent senators 188(4)
8.7 Concluding remarks 192(1)
Acknowledgements 193(1)
References 193(4)
Part III. Inter-Country Interactions
Chapter 9 Unilateralism in Trade Policy: A Survey of Alternative Political-Economy Approaches 197(16)
Pravin Krishna and Devashish Mitra
9.1 Introduction 198(2)
9.2 Models of reciprocated unilateralism 200(9)
9.2.1 A median-voter model 200(2)
9.2.2 A model with trade policy lobbying and endogenous lobby formation 202(6)
9.2.3 A model of leadership in trade policy negotiations 208(1)
9.3 Models of endogenous unilateralism 209(1)
9.3.1 Unilateral commitment to free trade as a means of preventing capital misallocation 209(1)
9.3.2 Unilateral commitment to free trade as a means of preventing wasteful political (organizational) activity 209(1)
9.4 Concluding remarks: the current state of the literature and issues for future research 210(2)
References 212(1)
Chapter 10 Trade Creation and Residual Quota Protection in a Free Trade Area with Domestic Monopoly 213(20)
David H. Feldman and Martin Richardson
10.1 Introduction 214(2)
10.2 Single domestic firm 216(4)
10.2.1 An FTA may not lead to any trade creation 217(2)
10.2.2 Welfare effects 219(1)
10.3 The political economy of FTA formation 220(9)
10.3.1 FTA is politically unattractive when profits and revenues are equally valued 222(3)
10.3.2 FTA can only be politically attractive if profits are more highly valued than revenues 225(4)
10.4 Conclusions 229(1)
Appendix A 230(1)
References 231(2)
Chapter 11 The Political Economy of Trade Sanctions Against South Africa: A Gravity Model Approach 233(16)
William H. Kaempfer and Martin Ross
11.1 Introduction: the law of demand for sanctions 234(1)
11.2 South African trade during the 1980's 235(3)
11.3 The gravity model of trade 238(3)
11.4 Empirical results 241(2)
11.5 Concluding remarks 243(1)
Acknowledgements 244(1)
References 244(5)
Part IV. Aid and Foreign Investment Policies
Chapter 12 The Political Economy of Unconditional and Conditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers 249(28)
Wolfgang Mayer and Alex Mourmouras
12.1 Introduction 250(4)
12.2 The common agency model 254(6)
12.2.1 Decision makers and their objectives 254(2)
12.2.2 Political equilibrium with unconditional assistance 256(1)
12.2.3 Political equilibrium with conditional assistance 257(3)
12.3 Instruments of assistance: loan rollovers vs. a final grant 260(2)
12.4 Unconditional assistance: the IFI should use a grant 262(4)
12.4.1 Unconditional loan decisions 263(1)
12.4.2 Unconditional grant decisions 264(2)
12.5 Conditional assistance: the IFI should use loans 266(5)
12.5.1 Conditional loan decisions 266(1)
12.5.2 Conditional grant decisions 267(4)
12.6 Concluding remarks 271(4)
Acknowledgements 275(1)
Appendix A. Derivation of Equation 18 275(1)
Appendix B. Derivation of Equation 19 275(1)
References 275(2)
Chapter 13 Crowding Out and Distributional Effects of FDI Policies 277(24)
Amy Jocelyn Glass and Kamal Saggi
13.1 Introduction 278(1)
13.2 Model 279(3)
13.3 No intervention and national treatment 282(3)
13.4 Discriminatory treatment 285(4)
13.4.1 Equilibrium 285(1)
13.4.2 Policy 286(2)
13.4.3 Discriminatory versus national treatment 288(1)
13.5 Most-favored-nation treatment 289(2)
13.5.1 Equilibrium 289(1)
13.5.2 Policy 289(1)
13.5.3 Discriminatory versus MFN treatment 290(1)
13.5.4 MFN versus national treatment 291(1)
13.6 Another basis for discrimination 291(1)
13.7 Conclusion 292(1)
Acknowledgements 293(1)
Appendix A 293(5)
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 293(1)
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 294(1)
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3 295(1)
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4 295(2)
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5 297(1)
A.6. Proof of Proposition 6 297(1)
References 298(3)
Index 301
The political economy of trade, aid and foreign investment policies /
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